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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines the relationship between social vulnerability and plant 
level emissions. It utilizes a mixed methods approach that includes: 1) the historical 
context of the food manufacturing industry, environmental regulations, and 
environmental activism; 2) geographic mapping of population characteristics 
surrounding food manufacturing plants; and 3) quantitative multilevel analyses of how 
the relationship between a manufacturing facility’s toxic emissions and the social 
vulnerability of the local population is mediated by community characteristics, 
organizational characteristics, and larger political-legal arrangements. This project 
extends organizational political economy theory of the environment to incorporate 
community characteristics and fills important gaps in the environmental justice 
literature.  
This project had several findings. First, the research suggests that populations 
with higher levels of social vulnerability are more at risk for being affected by emissions 
from food manufacturing facilities. Second, organizational and political-economy factors 
have a direct impact not only on organizational behavior (i.e. amounts of emissions), but 
how organizational behavior relates to additional factors such as social vulnerability, 
facility density, and environmental regulatory climate. Third, the fewer opportunities 
organizations had to exploit their local populations, the less likely the emissions were to 
be higher or hazardous. Finally, this dissertation calls for further research refining the 
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use of a social vulnerability score with additional population characteristics as well as a 
longitudinal analysis of the mediating factors outlined in this project.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Man lives on nature--means that nature is his body, with which he must remain in 
continuous interchange if he is not to die. That man's physical and spiritual life is linked 
to nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature. 
Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 
Nature shrinks as capital grows. The growth of the market cannot solve the very crisis it 
creates.  
Vandana Shiva, Soil Not Oil: Environmental Justice in an Age of Climate Crisis 
 
Introduction  
 Beginning with the rise of industrialization across the world, environmental 
degradation has become a very real concern. Increased development has meant increased 
exploitation of the natural world for short-term benefits to humanity. Production 
practices continue to involve the use of synthetic materials as well as the over use of 
finite energy resources (Harper, 2008).  Even in sociological research about the 
environment, the human exemptionalist paradigm (Catton and Dunlap 1978) has focused 
on the uniqueness of humanity, historically attributing all social problems to culture and 
ignoring the human-nature relationship in the study of social problems. With the rise of 
environmental sociology and what Catton and Dunlap (1978) termed the New Ecological 
Paradigm, scholars have acknowledged humans as part of an ecological whole with the 
implication that the environment needs to be an important aspect in any sociological 
analysis.  
 Dunlap and Catton’s analyses have become particularly poignant when 
confronted with the realities of pollution and its environmental effects. While climate 
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change has become a politically controversial topic,1 the consensus within the scientific 
community is that it is not only occurring at a significantly higher rate than pre-industrial 
times, but also that it is directly related to human production practices (Krause et al., 
1992; Cunningham et al., 2007).  Although less of a” mega-problem” than global 
warming (Giddens 2009), another outcome of pollution is the enormous amounts of 
toxic chemicals associated with production, most of which have the potential to do 
severe harm to humans in differing concentrations.  Additionally, water pollution has led 
to decreases in drinkable water, with various illnesses arising from human consumption 
of polluted water. 
 In recent years, researchers have analyzed and acknowledged that the social 
impacts of toxic pollution are unequal and have worked towards understanding this 
environmental inequality. On the community level, environmental justice scholars are 
concerned with the disproportionate impacts of toxic plant siting on poor and minority, 
predominantly African American populations (Bullard 1983; Mohai and Saha 2007). 
This stream of research has expanded, incorporating other disenfranchised populations 
including Native Americans (Hooks and Smith 2004), Latino Americans (Pastor, Sadd, 
and Hipp 2001; Morello-Frosch, Pastor, and Sadd 2001), and recent immigrants (Faber 
1998). Community-level researchers have also been concerned with how wealthier 
populations experience environmental privilege (Freudenburg 2005) and are able to 
                                                 
1 Ehrlich and Erhlich (1996) explore the rhetorical strategies used by anti-
environmentalists to misrepresent the empirical findings that clearly support the role of 
humanity in the degradation of the planet.  
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engage in environmentally destructive behaviors (e.g. cutting down forests to build a 
mansion on the top of a mountain), while blaming minority and immigrant populations 
for environmental degradation (Park and Pellow 2011).   
 Juxtaposed to research on environmental inequality, organizational researchers 
have focused on how plants (Grant and Jones 2003) and parent companies (Prechel and 
Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016) pollute the environment. This research examines 
the interactions between plants and the local population (Grant, Trautner, Downey, and 
Thiebaud 2010), plants and their parent companies (Prechel and Zheng 2012), and parent 
companies and their larger political organizational embeddedness (Prechel and Zheng 
2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016). Several sociologists have discussed the ability of large 
corporations to externalize environmental degradation to the population (Perrow 1984; 
Freudenburg 2005; Antonio 2009), and have examined environmental inequalities on the 
global level (York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003; Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 1996; 
Jorgenson and Clark 2012). To date, however, little research has simultaneously 
examined social vulnerability, organizational proximity, and the macro-political context 
under which both industry and communities interact with one another.  This dissertation 
adds to the literature on the intersections between risks associated with the social 
vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 1994; Cutter 1996; Van Zandt et al. 2012) of local 
communities and plant-level emissions (Tiefenbacher, Konopka, and Shelley 1997).  
 In this dissertation, I conduct a quantitative multilevel analysis of the toxic risk 
of food manufacturing plants.  Using organizational-political economy theory (Prechel 
and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Touché 2014; Prechel and Istvan 2016), I examine the 
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relationship between social vulnerability on the community-level with plant-level risky 
emissions. This analysis also includes a discussion of the historical context as well as the 
development of a social vulnerability measurement and mapping of population 
characteristics around these plants.  
Research Questions   
 This project examines plant level pollution and extends organizational-political 
economy theory to emphasize the disproportionate risks to socially vulnerable 
communities.  In the environmental justice literature, scholars have attempted to move 
beyond comparing race and class through the inclusion of other kinds of variables that 
focus on areal characteristics (Smith 2007), industrial based electrical utilities (Touché 
2012), percent of population that votes (Hird and Reese 1998), industrial development 
(Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser 1994), and population density (Hird and Reese 
1998). Moreover, recent research has focused on how class and race are simultaneously 
important in different but similarly negative ways (Downey 2005: 2007). However, two 
major gaps exist in the literature. First, no comprehensive analysis addresses how 
community characteristics interact with one another and how these interactions change 
depending on place. Second, although past studies deal with the environmental risk 
posed by hazardous plants (e.g., Ringquist 1997), they do not incorporate plant-specific 
variables into the analysis or test the ways plant-specific variables interact with local 
community characteristics. To date, there are only three studies that have examined 
community and corporate variables in the same analysis (Grant et al. 2004; Grant et al. 
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2010; Touche 2012).  To extend this literature, I ask two distinct, but interrelated 
questions:  
1) Are socially vulnerable populations at a disproportionate risk for being affected 
by emissions from food manufacturing plants? 
2) How do organizational and political-economic factors affect the relationship 
between socially vulnerable populations and the toxic emissions of local food 
manufacturing plants?  
 
 To answer these questions, I examined the United States food manufacturing 
industry.2 This industry is an interesting one to examine for three reasons. First, the food 
manufacturing industry is structurally different from other industries in the United 
States.3 Researchers argue that the significant competition in the food manufacturing 
industry makes it more responsive to consumers because companies need to maintain 
profits (Fryer and Versteeg 2008). Second, a large amount of research has been 
conducted on the sustainability of the food manufacturing process (Tilman, Cassman, 
Matson, Naylor, and Polasky 2002), the safety of these processes for the consumer 
(Antle 1996), and the safety of the process for workers (Komaki, Barwick, and Scott 
1978). However, very few studies have been conducted to understand the impacts of the 
                                                 
2 Food manufacturing refers to the process of physically or chemically changing raw 
materials into food, or changing food into different forms for human consumption. It is 
part of the larger food industry which incorporates agriculture, wholesale and 
distribution, and retail. It is regulated by at least three federal agencies, the U.S 
Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
 
3 Similarities exist also between the food industry and others, including historical 
changes that include periods of increased competition usually followed by increased 
consolidation through mergers and acquisitions (Papageorgiou, Michaelides, and 
Millions 2011).   
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production process on levels of risky emissions. Third, the U.S. food manufacturing 
industry has a “contradictory” relationship with the United States population. On the one 
hand, it is one of the largest industries in the country, affects much of the population, and 
employs a sizeable percentage of minority and low-income workers. According to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, the food manufacturing industry includes over 28,000 
plants and employs over 1.5 million people. It makes up over 10 percent of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector, and accounts for almost 13 percent of the nation’s gross domestic 
product. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that employment in this industry will 
increase by 7 percent by the year 2020, which means an increasing number of people 
will depend on the food manufacturing industry for their livelihoods. On the other hand, 
according to the Toxic Release Inventory of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 
TRI), the food manufacturing industry has consistently been among the top 10 highest 
emitters of toxic pollution with significant variation in the amount of emissions from one 
plant to another.   
I focus on several sectors within the food manufacturing industry. These include 
meatpacking, food packaging, and the processing of dairy and other products. The top 
emitting companies and companies with the most facilities include Tyson Foods (67 
facilities), Land O Lakes Inc. (50 facilities), Dean Foods (41 facilities), Pilgrim’s Pride 
(29 facilities), Archer Daniels Midland (22 facilities), Cargill Inc. (21 facilities), and 
Perdue farms (21 facilities).4 Before examining the role of the food manufacturing 
                                                 
4 Appendix A provides a complete list of all companies and the number of their facilities 
represented in the Toxic Release Inventory dataset for 2010.  
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industry in the United States and its connection to environmental regulation, I provide a 
brief history of the industry. This will be dealt with in further detail in chapter three.  
The U.S. Food Manufacturing Industry5 
 The contemporary food manufacturing industry dates back to the industrial 
revolution which led to mass production of food and the development of factories for 
food packaging, standardization, and preservation. Very early on, the food 
manufacturing industry became one of few employment options for immigrants and 
domestic minorities and was the subject of controversy. In his famous novel, The Jungle 
(1991(1906)), Upton Sinclair exposed class and power in America and the horrific 
working conditions within the meatpacking industry. His novel would eventually lead to 
the development of the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906), responsible for the creation of 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  In addition to the FDA, the 
food manufacturing industry was also regulated by the United States Department of 
Agriculture, the United States Food and Drug Association (USDA), and beginning in 
1970, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
From its beginnings in the late part of the 19th century and through its rapid 
growth following World War II, the food manufacturing industry dealt with very little 
environmental regulation. With the creation of the EPA and the authorization by the 
                                                 
 
5 Historical information came from an industry magazine, Food Processing. Additional 
information appears in summaries from the National Institutes of Health, U.S. 
Department of Commerce Industry report, Standard and Poor’s industry profile, and the 
website of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.   
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United States Congress of the Clean Air Act in 1970, this all changed. Since this time, 
the food manufacturing industry has had to contend with emissions, waste containment, 
and community–right to-know regulations. The 1977 and 1990 amendments to the Clean 
Air Act further increased the regulatory reach of the EPA and gave facilities further 
instructions on reducing air toxics. In addition, the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right to Know Act of 1986 established the Toxic Release Inventory, which required 
larger facilities to report toxic releases of selected chemicals each year.  
At the same time as the laws governing facility emissions were changing, the 
food manufacturing industry was also undergoing significant changes. By the 1970s, in 
order to maintain profits in a highly competitive market, companies undertook several 
different strategies including relying on marketing and advertising, downsizing through 
layoffs and plant closings, and mergers and acquisitions (Lo and Jacobsen 2011). At the 
same time, local governmental bodies and community development firms touted food 
manufacturing plants as a viable path for economic development in their local 
communities. To promote the siting of these plants within their communities, local and 
state governments established tax incentives and lax environmental regulations to entice 
companies to move into their areas (Broadway 2000; Fennelly and Leitner 2002; 
Leistritz and Sell 2001). For example, Leistritz and Sell (2001) documented how 
communities in North Dakota provided prospective plants an incentive package that 
included a five-year abatement on all county and school district taxes.  I examine within 
this historical context, the emissions of food manufacturing as it relates to socially 
vulnerable populations.  
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Dissertation Structure  
 The dissertation is made up of seven chapters. In this chapter, I introduced the 
project. In chapter two, I outline a review of the literature connected to this work. 
Chapter three provides a detailed historical context. Chapter four describes social 
vulnerability theory and its methodology. Chapter five describes my hypotheses and 
research design for a multilevel analysis. Chapter six presents the results and findings 
from the multilevel analyses. Chapter 7, the closing chapter, includes a detailed 
discussion of the findings and concluding thoughts.   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 This dissertation connects various fields of study within sociology and related 
disciplines to fill important gaps between the study of organizations, the political-legal 
context occupied by organizations and individuals, and the environmental inequalities 
present within these contexts. This chapter is broken up into several parts. In the first 
section, I discuss the macro theories of ecological modernization and the treadmill of 
production. In the second section, I focus on theories of community and environmental 
justice. The third section focuses on organizational characteristics and environmental 
behavior, and the last section lays out the conceptual framework, Organizational 
Political Economy, that I utilize throughout this dissertation. 
Macro-Ecological Theories 
 For several decades, scholars have been studying the relationship between the 
natural environment and the economy. On the macro level, two opposing theories stand 
at the forefront: Ecological Modernization and Treadmill of Production.  
Ecological Modernization proposes an optimistic view of mutual relationships 
between environmental concern and capitalist development. Overall, Ecological 
Modernization attempts to “re-rationalize the division of labor of modern industrialism 
to be less ecologically destructive and to internalize costs and impacts that are currently 
externalized” (Buttel 2000). Theorists in this tradition have argued that although 
economic growth has caused environmental problems, greater economic development 
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will eventually increase environmental consciousness and the gulf between the 
environment and economy will decrease (Mol and Sonnenfield, 2000; Spaargaren et al, 
2000; Rudel, Roberts, and Carmin 2011). Scholars present an environmental Kuznets 
curve arguing that as affluence increases, public concern, pressure from 
nongovernmental organizations, and environmental state policies will make curtailing 
environmental problems more cost effective for industry (Mol and Sonnenfield, 2000; 
Spaargaren et al, 2000).  
Ecological modernization theory has four main strands (Buttel 2000; Milanez 
and Buhrs 2007). The technological strand focuses on the ability of technological 
innovation to curb environmental degradation. Green technologies mean less 
degradation per unit output (Huber 2000). The policy strand focuses on the importance 
of government regulation in driving ecological modernization. Scholars argue that 
environmental accountability will increase with less government regulations and more 
incorporation of voluntary state-corporate agreements as well as market-based 
encouragement of innovation and self-regulation (Mol, 1995; Stretesky and Gabriel 
2005; Young 2000).  The social strand focuses on increasing environmental awareness 
within the society, which will inevitably change consumption patterns and have an 
indirect effect on production patterns (Christoff 1996; Buttel 2000). Finally, the 
economic strand focuses on the inevitability of the decoupling of economic growth from 
environmental impacts. This will occur as society moves away from manufacturing 
towards service oriented industries (Toke 2011).  
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In direct contradiction to Ecological Modernization, the Treadmill of Production 
contends that the goal of the capitalist society is continual capital accumulation. To 
fulfill this goal, producers must produce increasingly more. This continual production 
causes an irreconcilable conflict between the economy and the environment via the 
consumption of natural resources, the disposal of production wastes, and impacts on 
local communities and populations (Schnaiberg 1980; Schnaiberg and Gould, 1994). For 
the most part, because of an ideology of “progress,” workers become more “socially 
dislocated” (Gould, Pellow, and Schnaiberg 2004), environmental concern decreases 
(Givens and Jorgenson 2011), and the environmental degradation of the natural world 
continues even through technological advancements (York et al. 2003; Bell 2004; Gould 
et al. 2004). For example, treadmill scholars critique the environmental Kuznets curve 
by positing Jevon’s Paradox (York, Rosa, and Dietz 2010), which argues that rising 
production leads to increased consumption. This means that even if an industry adopts 
cleaner technologies, the treadmill effect is still occurring.     
These two macro-sociological theories of the environment address the larger 
relationship between the economy and the environment. They provide a context for local 
community dynamics. In the next section, I focus on theories of community and connect 
them to the environmental justice literature.  
Theories of Community and Environmental Justice 
The “Great change” thesis of community (Warren, 1972) argues that in the 
United States, communities have become less autonomous and have been impacted by 
the introduction of corporations and non-local government systems that maintain control 
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over these local communities.  At the same time, members of the community have 
become less cohesive because of developments in technology and increased population 
diversity that have increased the amount of distinct interests and associations. This 
reality, in conjunction with 1) the movement of historically local functions into the 
hands of government and corporations and 2) technology which has enabled people to 
“develop relationships based on factors other than residential proximity” (Warren 1972; 
11), has created community cohesion crises.  
 The interactional approach of community, however, argues that communities are 
never one cohesive unit. Distinct from the Great change thesis, the interactional 
approach takes on the question of fields of interaction (Kaufman 1959; Reiss 1959; 
Wilkinson 1999) to understand how a community is defined and operates, the roles of 
associations and networks within the community, the functions of leadership, power, and 
local social institutions’ collective action, and the development or decline of a shared 
community identity (Wilkinson 1999).  From this perspective, communities are not just 
one cohesive unit, but are made up of several groups that experience and respond 
differently to events, issues, and problems.  
Environmental justice research has scrutinized:  1) the relationship between 
community demographics and where companies site their plants (Anderton 1996; Been 
1994b; Downey 1998; Mohai and Saha 2007; Smith 2007), 2) the pollution output 
within those areas (Gelobter 1992; Bryant and Mohai 1992; Szasz and Meuser 1997), 
and 3) the government response to these localized environmental crises (Bullard 2005; 
Zimmerman 1993).   
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 Much environmental justice research has found race to be a significant predictor 
of proximity to polluting plants (Bullard 1983; Gelobter 1992; Mohai and Bryant 1992; 
Brown 1995; Downey 1998; Ringquist 1997; Stretesky and Lynch 2002; Mohai, Pellow, 
and Roberts 2009). Furthermore, researchers have observed that hazardous waste sites in 
minority communities take longer to be cleaned up, that government penalties for 
polluters are lower in minority neighborhoods (Lavelle and Coyle 1992), and that the 
environmental organizing in minority neighborhoods is less effective (Zimmerman 
1993). Newer research has begun to examine health outcomes. For example, EPA 
researchers (2002) have noted significant race differences in the occurrence of lead 
poisoning.  
 Other research has suggested that findings in line with an environmental racism 
model have been overstated, suggesting instead that class and socioeconomic status is at 
least as significant as race in understanding environmental inequality (Gould 1986; 
Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser 1994; Hamilton 1995; Tiefenbacher 1998; Hird 
and Reese 1998; Smith 2007). This research has found that there is a mix of variables 
that create environmental inequalities (Hird and Reese 1998; Smith 2007), and that there 
are considerable regional differences in these variables (Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and 
Fraser 1994; Mohai et al. 2009).  
The environmental justice framework (Pellow 2004) pays specific attention to 
the complex social interactions within any given community that can affect 
organizational action. This framework has four components: (1) it views environmental 
inequality as a process, (2) it gives attention to the complex roles of people and 
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organizations, (3) it considers the effects of pervasive inequality on stakeholders, and (4) 
it conceptualizes agency (i.e. the roles played by those confronted with environmental 
inequality to shape the outcomes of these conflicts). In short, environmental inequality is 
not just about correlations between environmental hazards and certain populations, it is 
about the mix of power dynamics, which includes the relationships between coalitions, 
fractions, and community organizations within local communities that produce and 
reproduce inequalities in relation to environmental risk.  
In addition, some research suggests that environmental justice findings relating to 
social class are complicated to interpret because of the complex role it plays in 
determining a population’s environmental vulnerability (Gould 1986).  For example, 
working class neighborhoods may be more impacted by toxic waste because industries 
are more likely to be located in their neighborhoods than in the most impoverished areas 
(Gould 1986).  Additionally, recent studies have examined how findings in the 
environmental justice literature are historically and spatially contingent (Pulido 2000). 
Furthermore, race and class do not necessarily operate as competing inequalities, but 
instead people of color and low social class status are affected by inequalities differently 
depending on their historical and contemporary context6 (Krieg 1995; Wilson 1996; 
Pellow 2004; Downey 2005; Downey 2007; Fernandez 2008). 
                                                 
6 Omi and Winant (1993) argue that race and class, for example, are complicated 
characteristics that are both part of a socio-historical process of change and 
transformation. While they form two different social hierarchies, they are not competing, 
but “mutually reinforcing” phenomena that strengthen overall social inequalities (Sewell 
1992; Bonilla Silva 1997; Jewell 2007).   
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The spatial mismatch thesis (Wilson 1996; Fernandez 2008) is one way of 
examining the relationship between race and class in American society.  It claims that 
urban minorities have been disproportionately affected by job relocation from cities to 
the suburbs. This places minorities at a disadvantage in the work force (Royce 2015). At 
the same time, however, this historical process has also meant that suburban working-
class whites and minorities have increasingly become exposed to risky emissions 
(Downey 2005; 2007; Kreig 1995). This complex relationship calls for a new kind of 
analysis that deals with this reality. Researchers studying environmental vulnerability 
(and social vulnerability more specifically) began in the 1990s to address this concern 
and the complicated dynamics associated with environmental inequality.7 
While moving in the direction of understanding the importance of organizations 
in these analyses, the Environmental Justice literature does not focus directly on the 
organizations that make up an important part of the social structure and that are intense 
polluters.  Research in organizations and the environment has begun to fill this gap.  The 
next section connects research on organizations with environmental research within the 
field of sociology.  
Organizational Environmental Behavior  
 Within the organizational literature, there have been many attempts to explain 
organizational outcomes based on an organization’s characteristics. Theorists concerned 
with the effect of an organization’s environment on its actions have used one of two 
                                                 
7 I address social vulnerability more specifically in Chapter four of this dissertation.  
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theoretical frameworks. Population ecologists have argued that once social structures are 
established they follow a process similar to biological evolution. Organizational forms 
develop a superior fit based on their environment and those that are unable to, “die off” 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977).  Within this perspective, structural inertia variables such as 
an organization’s size, age, or complexity affect its ability to change (Hannan and 
Freeman 1984). However, organizational decision making tends to be more complex 
than the linear model presented in this school of thought. Alternatively, Resource 
Dependency theory examines the ways organizations are both dependent and exert 
influence on their external environments (Pfeffer 1972; Prechel 2000; Sherer and Lee 
2002). Resource Dependency theorists argue that the external opportunities and 
constraints of organizations can affect a variety of corporate behaviors. These behaviors 
include corporate acquisitions (Palmer et al. 1995) and corporate form change (Prechel 
2000). 
Corporate form has been an important variable within the organizational 
literature. Since Berle and Means (1932) first discussed the divergence of ownership and 
control within the modern corporation, scholars have studied the causes of corporate 
form changes. They argue that corporations change form for several reasons including: 
efficiency purposes (Chandler, 1962); the political-legal environment (Prechel 2000); the 
informal authority within the organizations (Fligstein 2000); and organizational 
networks (Palmer et al. 1993). Recent literature in this area has moved away from 
identifying the causes of corporate form change to using corporate form as an 
explanatory variable, for example identifying the effects of corporate form on corporate 
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malfeasance (Prechel and Morris 2010) and corporate pollution (Prechel and Zheng 
2014).  
 Including some of the main explanatory variables identified within research on 
complex organizations, scholars have examined organizational characteristics associated 
with high organizational pollution rates. Grant et al. (2002) studied the relationship 
between plant level pollution and organizational size. Within the chemical industry, they 
found that larger plants (i.e. plants with more employees) pollute at higher rates than 
smaller plants, but this relationship weakens as the plants get larger. Furthermore, they 
find that larger plants pollute at higher rates especially if they are a part of a large 
corporation. In another study, Grant and Jones (2003) use previous work by Prechel and 
Boies (1998) to show that corporations in the high-risk chemical industry were among 
the first to change to the multi-layered subsidiary form where liability firewalls exist. 8 
They found that plants that were also subsidiaries polluted at higher rates than other 
plants.  
In recent years, this literature has expanded to include the parent company of a 
corporation. Using previous research on the multilayered subsidiary-form and 
corporations’ embeddedness within a larger political economy (Prechel 2000; Prechel 
and Morris 2010), Prechel and Zheng (2012) engaged in a large-scale analysis of the 
effects of firm level characteristics on pollution. The firm was used as the unit of 
                                                 
8 According to Prechel and Boies (1998:325), a corporation operating using a multi-
layered subsidiary form has “a hierarchy of two or more levels of subsidiary 
corporations with a parent company at the top operating as a management company.” 
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analysis because that is where ultimate organizational decision-making power rests. 
These researchers reported significant variation between industries and discussed the 
need for more industry specific environmental research that would account for 
historically specific circumstances. To date, scholars have examined historical changes 
within the U.S. electrical energy industry (Prechel 2012) and their relationship to 
corporate toxic emissions rates (Prechel and Touché 2014; Prechel and Istvan 2016).  
Three recent projects (Grant et al. 2004; Grant et al. 2010; Touché 2012) 
considered the relationship between environmental justice and organizational toxic 
emissions.  In the first project, the researchers tested only interactions between absentee 
ownership (i.e., plants that are located in a different state from their headquarters) and its 
effect on community engagement (Grant et al. 2004). Grant et al. (2010) conducted a 
“fuzzy-set analysis”9 to investigate the relationships between organizational variables 
and community level variables. Their findings indicated that certain “recipes of risk” for 
pollution exist in which race and socio-economic status matters and when they do not. 
They focused, however, on the qualitative relationships between selected demographic 
and organizational variables and did not consider the larger organizational political 
economy as conceptualized by Prechel and colleagues. Touché (2012) conceptualized 
this larger organizational political economy and included community-level variables, but 
did not examine ways that community-level variables interact with one another and with 
                                                 
9 A fuzzy set analysis is a variant of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). This 
method uses Boolean algebra to determine the impact of certain combinations of 
descriptors on a specific outcome (Ragin 2000; Grant et al. 2010).  
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the local plant to produce environmental risk to local populations. Although my 
dissertation is in line with Touché’s research and the conceptual framework that he used, 
I conceptualize community demographic variables as intersecting phenomena, rather 
than competing variables.10 Furthermore, instead of comparing the importance of 
organizational factors versus community factors, I theorize that organizational and larger 
societal factors mediate community-plant relationships. In other words, organizational 
and other, macro-structural characteristics influence the way plants behave within local 
communities.  
Conceptual Framework- Organizational Political Economy of the Environment 
 A theory of Organizational political economy begins with the understanding 
developed by classical sociologists that different parts of the social structure are 
entwined and must be understood in that way (Prechel and Istvan 2016). This theory 
suggests that “variations in social structures create different dependences, incentives, 
and opportunities for corporations to externalize pollution costs to society” (Prechel and 
Zheng 2012). Specifically, it argues that (1) in order to understand the actions of the 
capitalist class, historical conditions under which they act must be accounted for 
(Prechel 1990), (2) these  historical conditions include the political-legal arrangements 
that determine the degree of embeddedness of the corporation within the state (Prechel 
                                                 
10 This notion of community as relational and not made up of discreet, mutually 
exclusive identities is in line with the theory of intersectionality and the matrix of 
domination addressed by Patricia Hill Collins and other scholars of race and gender 
(Collins 2000; Collins 2010). 
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and Morris 2010), and (3) the embeddedness of corporations within interrelated 
ideological, political, and economic institutions in society that affects organizational 
behavior (Prechel 2000; Zald and Lounsbury 2010). 
 Within an organizational political economy framework, not all events or 
processes are made equal. Pulling from historical contingency theory (Prechel 2003), 
this framework, particularly suited for examining lengthy periods of time, allows the 
researcher to examine how multiple causes are time dependent and affect long term 
pathways and trajectories. It emphasizes the historical conditions that make distinct 
theories and explanations have more or less explanatory power. So, under certain 
conditions, X will have an effect on Y, and under certain conditions Z will have a more 
direct effect on Y.  In other words, time matters.  
George Steinmetz (2005) argues that  
“historical events are always produced by contingent conjunctures of causal 
mechanisms. Earlier conjunctures influence the intensity or particular value of 
any given mechanism in the present; they also codetermine whether a particular 
mechanism will be suppressed or expressed. What this means is that all events 
are partly shaped by earlier conjunctures, via historical paths (145).”  
 
The key here is that these historical paths or trajectories are contingent upon a series of 
factors and critical points (Haydu 1998).  There are always other options or trajectories 
given a critical juncture, however, once one moves down a certain path, the harder it is 
to shift from that path without significant forces at play. The path itself becomes a self-
reinforcing feedback process (Pierson 2000; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2005) 
In studying the development of state policy, Prechel (1990: 650) argued that “the 
state is affected by: 1) internal organizational arrangements and 2) changes in the 
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societal environment, which include the degree of economic power of capitalist groups, 
political unity among capitalist groups, and historical conditions under which these 
outside groups attempt to influence policy.” These outcomes, although led by a 
rationalization process (Weber 2009; Prechel 2003), leads to irrationalities within the 
social structure (i.e., irrational outcomes arise out of rational decision-making processes 
within the capitalist framework).   
Organizational Political Economy theory is equipped to deal with the complexity 
of organizational-community interactions because of two reasons. First, it takes into 
account the effect of the external environment on how organizations shape themselves in 
response to market and regulatory incentives, constraints, and opportunities present in 
that environment (Prechel and Morris 2010; Touché 2012; Prechel 2012; Prechel and 
Zheng 2012). Second, it examines the way organizations affect their external 
environments through externalizing pollution costs to society (Prechel and Zheng 2012; 
Prechel and Istvan 2013). For these reasons, organizational political economy can both 
help us understand organization-state relationships and the relationships between the 
organization and its local community, especially to the extent that an organization’s 
risky emissions are impacted by both state and local contexts.  
Concluding Remarks 
Using organizational political economy theory, I theorize that community-plant 
relationships are mediated by other aspects of society. So, to understand the relationship 
between community demographics and toxic emissions, one must understand the 
organizational-political contexts in which these relationships are embedded. That is to 
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stay, the development of the environmental behavior within the food manufacturing 
industry is a product of the development of the industry itself, the development of 
government policies, and the development of environmental collective action. 
Furthermore, the additions of exogenous shocks11 serve to unexpectedly shift the 
trajectory of environmentalism in the U.S. over time. In the next chapter, I discuss these 
historical developments in some detail.  
  
                                                 
11 Institutional scholars utilize the idea of exogenous shocks (Widmaier, Blythe, and 
Seabrooke 2007) to help understand contingent circumstances that can change a 
historical trajectory.  These shocks can be in the form of unexpected significant 
occurrences that may have nothing to do with the path (e.g., terrorist attack) that 
nonetheless have a very real impact on its continued development. These shocks may 
also be more intentional acts of collective action that serve to push for changes in 
organizational or political arenas (e.g., social movements).  
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CHAPTER III 
HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Introduction  
 In this chapter, I utilize an Organizational Political Economy framework (Prechel 
2000; Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016) to document historical 
developments in environmental degradation and activism, government policies and 
regulations, and industry change and action in the United States. Although this chapter 
follows a chronological timeline, the organizing principle revolves around the 
opportunities and challenges experienced by three key actors (activists, government, and 
industry) during each period.  Following a brief background, I begin the historical 
context with the 1960s-- a time of new environmental awareness and the rapid growth of 
the food industry. I then analyze the 1970s, characterized by a growth in public 
environmentalism and fragmentation around what it meant to be “environmentally 
friendly.” The 1980s saw the upsurge of strong anti-environmentalist sentiment within 
the federal government as well as the coming together of environmentalists in direct 
response to this perceived threat. By the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s, large scale 
environmental problems, such as ozone layer depletion and global warming along with 
increases in mainstream recognition of environmental justice issues, renewed a public 
interest in environmentalism.  By the 2000s, the “war on terror” marked a reduced 
prioritization of environmental issues in the federal governmental even as environmental 
justice issues gained momentum on local levels.  
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Background  
Environmental Political Economy scholars have stressed that within the 
industrial city (Mumford 1956; Mumford 1968) there are two dynamics constantly in 
conflict. On the one hand, the industrial city is the site of capitalist growth, development, 
and prosperity (Buttel 2000). On the other hand, seen as a “necessary by-product of 
urban and industrial growth” (Gottlieb 2005), environmental decay disproportionately 
impacts poor workers and communities (Schnaiberg 1980; Bullard 1983; Gould, Pellow, 
and Schnaiberg 2004). Food production, in particular, has garnered specific attention 
from community members and community groups.  
The modern-day food industry first began to take form during the late part of the 
19th and the beginning of the 20th century. During the Gilded Age (1870-1900),12 public 
policy encouraged unregulated corporate growth with companies expanding through the 
acquisition of subsidiaries.13 For the manufacturing industry in general, the period 
between 1870 and 1920 was a time of substantial growth, increases in the scale of 
production, and decreases in the value of pure agricultural products compared to 
processed goods (Melosi 1980).  In Nature’s Metropolis (1992), William Cronon 
describes how Chicago became the linkage between the rural, undeveloped Western part 
                                                 
12 The Gilded Age is the period between 1870 and 1900 where the United States began 
experiencing significant industrial development in various industries.  
 
13 This is largely due to the development of laws such as the New Jersey Holding 
Company Act. The Holding Company Act of New Jersey 1889 created weak rules 
around corporate incorporation and allowed for companies to buy and sell stock of other 
companies, allowing for a holding company structure to emerge (Berle and Means 1932; 
Prechel 2000).  
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of the United States and the manufacturing markets in the Eastern part of the country. 
The development of refrigeration made it easier for food products (specifically meat) to 
be transported longer distances and with an expanded railroad system routed through 
Chicago, these food products were able to move more quickly and freely across the 
country  
Initially, the U.S. food industry was made up of small and medium size 
companies that were not particularly efficient and, unlike other developed sectors of the 
economy e.g. steel, was unable to conduct mass distribution across the United States 
(Connor et al. 1996; Prechel 1990; Prechel 1994). By the 1920s, however, food 
companies grew substantially as the U.S. government facilitated the industrialization of 
agriculture, tying small local producers directly to industry (Danborn 1979). This 
solidified the implementation of modern production technologies into the food 
manufacturing process and strengthened the dependence of local farmers on newer 
manufacturing practices (Friedman 1993). Furthermore, economies of scale were 
developing across the U.S., which made efficiencies in distribution of food products 
essential. The period between the 1920s and 1940s saw waves of mergers, which would 
eventually lead to the development of a block of large well-known companies, still 
present today.  
  Increasing size and power of the United States food manufacturing and 
processing industries meant the perception of increasing wealth for the communities 
where they were located. Both workers and the communities they lived in were 
immediately affected by the changing landscape of food production (Grindler 1980).  
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For this reason, early on we find that although environmental hazards such as smoke 
pollution became a mainstay of urban living (Grindler 1980), local government officials 
were unwilling to take any significant stand against manufacturing development.14 
Within these communities, there were limited waste restrictions or industrial dumping 
regulations (Colten 1988). Additionally, working conditions in many of the factories 
within this industry was deplorable.  Locally, companies were not held responsible for 
any environmental damage they caused. Rather, the problems associated with industrial 
development continued throughout the early part of the twentieth century and any 
response to localized environmental destruction was led by concerned community 
members (Gottlieb 2005).15  
As early as the late 19th century, individuals and community groups were 
documenting both the plight of the worker in the factory and the hazards in communities 
located next to factories—with local populations subject to toxins as a byproduct of 
these factories.16 Additionally, the later part of the 19th and early 20th century saw the 
                                                 
14 Although much of the progressive movement was local, several national leaders 
became reformers as well. As a leader of this movement, Theodore Roosevelt pushed for 
increased regulations on corporations (Murray and Blessing 2004) and environmental 
conservation (Brinkley 2009). 
 
15 Women’s groups, as part of the progressive movement, were some of the first to take 
up the charge against local environmental damage. Because it was women/homemakers 
that were consistently exposed to the ills of smoke pollution, these issues became the 
domain of middle and upper-class women. Groups worked to garner support for 
environmental ordinances such as stronger regulations on smoke stacks and at times 
even worked assisting stack inspectors during their monitoring visits (Grindler 1980).   
16 These concerns are the precursors of public health, social work, and the more radical 
environmental movements in the United States (Gottlieb 2005). 
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development of professional groups and government agencies focused on combatting 
some of these issues. The Air Pollution Control Association, first made up of smoke 
inspectors, was later broadened to those interested in technical solutions for industrial air 
pollution (Christy 1960). The group focused on updating procedures and materials to 
cause less environmental harm (Gottlieb 2005).  Sanitarians, precursors to modern day 
public health workers, focused on community members. They promoted sanitary 
practices, developed public education, and worked to improve laws associated with 
public health (Melosi 2000). Additionally, the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) that 
created the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and, as we will discuss later in this chapter, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were all designated as government agencies 
tasked with regulating industries, including food manufacturing and processing.  
This brief background sets the stage for developments during more contemporary 
times. In the following sections, I outline key historical developments over the last forty 
years of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century that 
provide a comprehensive context for the quantitative analyses in this dissertation.   
The 1960s: New Environmental Awareness and the Growth of the Food Industry  
After World War II, along with increases in consumption and production, the U.S 
food industry grew exponentially. The food processing technologies developed during 
war time became a mainstay as the U.S. population continued to grow. Particularly 
between 1963 and 1972, the industry showed a “clear upward trend (Papageorgious, 
Michaelides, and Milios 2011).” During this time, merger activity to connect geographic 
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regions and product lines was high and public opinion showed an overall satisfaction 
with the food industry.  According to an Australian article (Gruen 1968), the U.S. was a 
major innovator in food processing.  
As the food industry continued to grow, government engagement also developed. 
In 1958, congress enacted the Food Additives Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act of 1938. The Delaney Clause within the amendment stated that any 
substance found to cause cancer could not be used as a food additive.  In 1964, Congress 
set up the National Commission on Food Marketing to report on changes in the food 
industry. Originally introduced by Sen. Gale W. McGee, who was a democrat from 
Wyoming, this commission, which went completely unopposed17, was tasked with 
investigating the “purchasing, processing, marketing and pricing practices of large chain 
stores to determine whether there may have been any violation of antitrust laws” (CQ 
Alamanac 1964). The commission, composed of five senators, five representatives, and 
five members appointed by the President 18(CQ Alamanac 1964), released a final report 
                                                 
17Although, this bill was unopposed, in her endorsement of the commission, Esther 
Peterson, special assistant to the President on Consumer Affairs, suggested that the 
Commission include representatives of the public, rather than of the food industry, but 
indicated that spokesmen for the food industry should be allowed to express their full 
views to the Commission. 
18 President Johnson appointed the five public members of the Commission on Food 
Marketing. They were: William M. Batten, a Republican, president of the J. C. Penney 
Co.; Albert K. Mitchell, a cattle producer and Republican National Committeeman from 
New Mexico, former president of the American National Livestock Assn., and a member 
of several advisory committees to the Secretary of Agriculture; former U.S. Rep. J. Fred 
Marshall (D Minn. 1949-63), a farmer and former state director of the Minnesota Farm 
Security Administration (1941-48); Elmer R. Kiehl, a professor of agricultural 
economics, former dean of the College of Agriculture at the University of Missouri, and 
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in 1965. This report, totaling about 3,800 pages, presented several significant findings. 
First, it outlined the U.S shift from small farming to industrial farming—showing that 
most of the farming decisions were being made by “feed manufacturers, slaughter 
houses or processors of food and vegetables (Gruen 1968; 26).19 Second, it outlined the 
growing profitability of industries that incorporate a high amount of processing (e.g., TV 
dinners, baby food, and soft drinks to name a few) (Gruen 1968; 27). Third, the 
commission found that prices for processed products were higher in small independent 
stores that tended to be located in low income areas, making it more difficult for people 
in those neighborhoods to purchase the best food products. Fourth, the commission 
noted that the food industry operated at elevated levels of efficiency, innovation, and 
general progressiveness (Connor 1982; 95).”20 
As the industry continued to grow and government support was solidified 
through reports like the one illustrated above, conflict between the ways the public 
prioritized improving living standards and material comforts (Gottlieb 2005; Kline 2011) 
                                                 
member of the advisory commission to the Secretary of Agriculture; and Marvin Jones, 
of Texas, former Chief Justice of the U.S. Court of Claims (1947-64), a Democrat, who 
was named Commission Chairman. Jones resigned as chairman Sept. 1 and President 
Johnson appointed Phil S. Gibson, former chief justice of the California Supreme Court, 
to replace him on September17th. 
19 These decisions are backed by long term contracts between the processors and the 
farmers themselves (Leonard 2014). This is particularly important as small farmers 
continued to believe in their own independence from the larger structures and that they 
have more control over the process than they actually had at the time.  
 
20 The commission also expressed concern over the industry’s heavy emphasis on 
advertising and product differentiation and the growing centralization of both food 
manufacturing and distribution 
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and the development of a new environmental awareness also grew. In 1959 alone, 
industrial, private, and other sources of pollution emitted 24.9 million tons of soot into 
the air throughout the nation. As in previous decades, the development and increase in 
landfills was exorbitant. These landfills were public health hazards and contaminated 
both urban and rural communities. Furthermore, these landfills were showing signs of 
being discriminatory i.e. being placed in areas with minority and poor populations 
(Gottlieb 2005).  These ecological threats associated with increasing manufacturing, 
created a context where the public would now, more systematically examine the dangers 
of industrial pollution and environmental degradation.  
In the early 1960s, the wider public was becoming increasingly aware of the 
dangers associated with industrial development. Murray Bookchin (1962) warned of the 
ecological problems and public health issues caused by technological and industrial 
growth. He promoted the development of technology in environmentally friendly ways 
(Kline 2011). In 1962, Rachel Carson published Silent Spring, unearthing the dangers of 
pesticide use. In an interview with the New Yorker, Carson warned that the American 
public was living in “an era dominated by industry, in which the right to make money, at 
whatever cost to others, is seldom challenged.” (Gottlieb 1993). As Carson’s research 
became popular, President Kennedy’s Science Advisory Committee examined her 
claims about pesticide use and provided recommendations (Kline 2011). The Panel on 
the Use of Pesticides, made up of scientists from several universities outlined the 
benefits and risks of pesticide use and recommended more research on the effects of 
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pesticides, federal funds to assist states in pesticide monitoring, and the development of 
an education program regarding the hazards of pesticide use (Panel Report 1963).  
At the same time as the food industry was undergoing significant changes and 
some public scrutiny, the first law attempting to control air pollution was passed.21 The 
Clean Air Act of 196322 provided guidance to states on how to reduce pollution,23 
maintained the responsibility of state and local governments to control pollution within 
their bounds, and increased the authority of the federal government to continue 
researching air pollution and pollution abatement practices. Its precursor, the Air 
Pollution Control Act of 1955, provided funding for research associated with air 
pollution. However, the act had no provision for actual pollution abatement and 
enforcement (CQ Almanac 1963). The 1963 law provided federal funds for state and 
local enforcement and empowered the federal government to “bring suit” against 
polluters with the governor’s approval. The provision empowering the federal 
                                                 
21 The air pollution control Act of 1955 was the first act involving air pollution and in 
line with the focus on environmental research, it provided funds for federal research into 
pollution (EPA website, Clean Air Act). 
 
22 Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), and his Great Society battled what he called the problem of 
the vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of shrinking open space, and of an overall 
environment that is diminished daily by pollution and noise and blight.  Congress 
strengthened the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts in 1964. LBJ got most of what he 
requested from Congress after he won a landslide over Barry Goldwater (Boyer et al. 
2005). 
 
23 Most Republicans voted against this act and it was opposed by the National 
Association of Manufacturers. Stating that “communities are entirely capable of carrying 
out effective air pollution control programs without federal financial aid and federal 
enforcement activities (CQ Almanac 1963) 
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government turned out to be a pivotal point that solidified federal participation in 
pollution reduction. This act would set the stage for increasingly comprehensive 
provisions in air pollution abatement over the next 15 years of U.S. history.  
In 1964, President Johnson empowered an Environmental Pollution Panel from 
his Science Advisory Committee to research pollution in the United States. The 
committee acknowledged pollution as an inevitable outcome of development, but noted 
that it was important to reduce the magnitude of problems associated with pollution, 
stating explicitly:  
Society must take the position that no citizen, no industry, no municipality has 
the right to pollute. We must rely on economic incentives to discourage 
pollution. Under this plan, special taxes would be levied against polluters. The 
manpower, knowledge, and facilities now at hand are insufficient for the 
complete task of pollution abatement and management. Large numbers of well 
trained technicians, engineers, economists, and scientists will be needed (Johnson 
1965).  
 
Although this was a significant turning point for the government response to pollution 
associated with industrial development, naming polluters other than industry gave 
leeway to what pollution regulations would prioritize. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
trained practitioners, solidified the focus on technical solutions over any other.  
The late 1960s and early part of the 1970s showed a growing food industry 
coupled with an increase in public concern for the environment, with environmental 
movements and organizations proliferating across the country. Mainstream communities 
as well as the growing counterculture were both looking at the environmental problems 
  
34 
 
that continued to develop (Gottlieb 2005; Gitlin 1980).24  By 1970, 53% of respondents 
to a public opinion survey saw pollution reduction as one of three major problems that 
needed government attention. This was up from 17% only five years earlier in 1965 
(Kline 2011). Additionally, scientists/activists such as Barry Commoner, were influential 
in centering the negative role of industry in increasing environmental degradation. This 
was the context in which, President Richard Nixon took office— a strong industry 
outlook and a public pushing for cleaning up the environment as a priority (Kline 2011). 
The 1970s: Environmental Crescendo and Then a Crisis 
Environmental consciousness came in with a surge in the early part of the 1970s, 
with various actors vying for a place at the environmental agenda table. Two arenas 
where this cacophony of voices met was in the development and implementation of the 
first federal earth day and the changes in the federal government’s environmental 
bureaucracy. In this section, I engage with these two arenas. This section ends with a 
discussion of the OPEC Oil Crisis.   
Earth Day  
By Earth Day 1970, there was a groundswell of public concern about the 
environment. This series of events, seen as marking the beginning of the new 
environmental movement solidified the main actors in U.S. environmentalism (Kline 
                                                 
24 One example of radical responses to industrial pollution was the radical protests of a 
group called the MotherFuckers led by Amira Baraka in the garbage strike of 1967-
1968. The group transferred bags full of garbage dumped in poor communities such as 
the Lower East side to Lincoln Center (Gottlieb 2005; Gitlin 1980). 
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2011).25 First conceptualized as a National Teach-In Day on the crisis of the 
environment, Earth Day was supposed to serve two goals: 1) “help crystallize the new 
environmentalist constituency” and 2) “distancing the new environmentalist 
constituency from more radical New left and counterculture activities (Gottlieb 2005; 
148-149).” President Nixon’s administration sought to gain the support of the middle-
class environmentalists thereby neutralizing the radicals in the process (Gottlieb 2005; 
153). This mainstream goal, however, was outdone by several factors and Earth Day 
became a microcosm of the important actors in the ongoing struggle for an 
environmental consensus.  
In addition to the federal government, two additional competing interests 
attempted to utilize opportunities in earth day participation. The radical left developed 
alternative earth day events and protested the mainstream events to connect 
environmental activism to other issues including the Vietnam War, racial injustices in 
the U.S., and more broadly the actions of unethical, irresponsible corporations and 
government conservatives (Gottlieb 2005).  Although, not yet named, environmental 
justice proponents sought to get recognition that environmental awareness was not just 
about preserving and conserving nature, but also about the disproportionate impacts of 
environmental ills on minorities. In reference to Earth Day, Denis Hayes stated that the 
intent was “not to clean the air while leaving slums and ghettos, nor is it to provide a 
                                                 
25 Up until this point the key players in environmentalism were large environmental non-
profits such as the Sierra Club. Earth Day, however, included mainstream middle-class 
voters, government actors, radical leftist activities, as well as corporate support and 
sponsorships.  
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healthy world for racial oppression and war (Egan 2010).” While, everyone was 
impacted by environmental harm and all needed to participate, there was the growing 
realization that minority and poor communities were being impacted in different, 
stronger ways.  
 As a third set of actors in the ongoing conflicts around the environment, industry 
groups and companies used Earth day to position themselves as willing participants in 
preserving the environment (Time Magazine 1969).  Monsanto, for example, “heralded 
their readiness to become environmental leaders in the coming decade by applying 
pollution control technologies in their own facilities (Gottlieb 2005; 153-154).”  Having 
significant resources and power to drive the flow of information from media sources, 
corporate interests were particularly successful in getting their message to mainstream 
audiences, while media attention on alternative events was limited (Gottlieb 2005).  
While at the same time as Earth Day showed the fractures in what it meant to be 
environmentally conscious it also turned environmentalism into a consensus issue. It 
provided an opportunity for corporations, to use environmental marketing as a way to 
increase their profit margins and allowed for the Nixon Administration to pass more 
palatable legislation (Gottlieb 2005). The next few years would see significant changes 
in the government bureaucracy set to regulate the environment.  
New Environmental Regulations and a New Regulatory Agency  
With the momentum from Earth Day planning and festivities, the support for 
environmental legislation was high. To show his unwavering support for this issue, 
Nixon’s 1970 state of the union address asked, “shall we surrender to our surroundings, 
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or shall we make our peace with nature and begin to make reparations for the damage we 
have done to our air, to our land, and to our water?” He goes on to say “We still think of 
air as free. But clean air is not free, and neither is clean water. The price tag on pollution 
control is high. Through our years of past carelessness we incurred a debt to nature, and 
now that debt is being called.”  These statements mirrored environmental legislation 
already in the works as well as foreshadowed the slew of environmental legislation to 
come.26 By January 1st, 1970, President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), which was the first law to require an environmental impact statement for 
construction projects that were federally funded. The legislation also created the Council 
for Environmental Quality to oversee this process.  In a 1971 report, the council 
acknowledged the disproportionate impact of environmental hazards on poor and 
minority communities27 (Kline 2011; Gottlieb 2005). In response, Nixon and his White 
House Commission on Executive Reorganization called for the development of a new 
government bureaucracy that would deal with all pollution issues (Kline 2011; Gottlieb 
2005). 
                                                 
26 One change in environmental regulations was the 1972 revision to the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. In this revision, oversight of pesticide 
regulations moved from under the purview of the U.S. Department of Agriculture into 
the realm of the Environmental Protection Agency. Along with this shift in agency 
oversight, the emphasis of the act expanded from providing information for consumer 
safety to promoting public and environmental health through increased enforcement.  
 
27 This is only one example of studies during the 1970s and 1980s that began to focus 
primarily on these groups as victims of air pollution. The Urban Environment 
Conference also sought to begin turning that realization into action (Gottlieb 2005). 
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 In the very beginning, it was unclear what exactly the role of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was going to be. Initially, it became a “dumping point” for all 
the federal government’s environmental programs.28 The first head of the EPA, William 
D. Ruckelhaus, was tasked with developing the new agency’s structures and goals (Kline 
2011). With a budget of 1.3 billion dollars and almost six thousand staff made up of 
government workers that had previously been housed in various parts of the government, 
this new agency upended the environmental status quo and shifted the dynamics in 
environmental politics within the United States. Mainstream environmentalism needed 
to evolve to keep up with all the changes happening during this period. With the EPA in 
charge of implementation of many of the new environmental policies, the large 
environmental non-profit organizations, needed to increasingly look to the EPA as 
important to their agendas and concerns (Gottlieb 2005; Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 
1994).  
 In addition to the EPA and NEPA, another very influential piece of legislation 
that occurred in the same year was the 1970 amendment to the Clean Air Act,29 which 
                                                 
28 The newly created EPA housed the federal water quality administration, all the 
department of interior’s pesticide programs, the national air pollution control 
administrations’ pesticide research, the bureau of water hygiene, parts of the Bureau of 
Radiological Health from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, the 
Department of Agriculture’s pesticide activities, both the Atomic Energy Commission’s 
and Federal Radiation’s Council radiation and standards program, and the ecological 
research from the Council on Environmental Quality.  
 
29 Other laws were developed under the same approach as the Clean Air Act. The Clean 
Water Act; otherwise known as the Water Pollution Amendments of 1972, the 1970 
Resource Recovery Act, and the 1972 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
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established standards to regulate toxic air emissions (Kline 2011). Although becoming a 
significant piece of legislation, the struggles over this amendment was substantial. 
Within the federal government, conflict between the Nixon Administration and Senator 
Edmund Muskie fractured government interests (Kline 2011); the administration’s bill 
first passing through the house and the partner bill, written by Muskie’s office passing 
through the senate. Differences in the two bills included deadlines to curb automobile 
emissions (more rigorous in the Muskie bill) and the actual role of the federal 
government in setting standards and enforcement. Some scholars argue that this led to a 
stronger set of plans within the amendment than would have otherwise been presented 
(Jones 1978; Gonzalez 2001). 
The fight over the clean air act also showed industry fractures. With much of the 
bill focusing on changes in automobile standards, the automobile industry as well as 
companies associated with fuel additives, such as lead were particularly vocal against it. 
Other industry representatives were less so, and in fact many were in support of some 
form of extension to this act (CQ Almanac 1970). The development of an ecological 
conscience within the general population and the opportunities to market themselves as 
environmentally friendly, meant industries not directly impacted by the provisions in 
these new bills sought to show their direct support of new environmental legislation. The 
unintended results of this support included the outlining of six specific criteria pollutants 
                                                 
Act Amendments.  The scope of this dissertation is air pollution so I will not discuss 
these in detail, although they were very important in the period discussed.  
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(Gottlieb 2002) and 19 harmful air pollutants (Kline 2011) to be regulated. This would 
come to have an important impact on future emissions reporting and regulations under 
the EPA (Gottlieb 2002; Gottlieb 2005; Gonzalez 2001).  
The Oil Crisis of 1973 and the Carter Administration  
As the new environmental movement became mainstream and public support 
continued to increase, the Oil Crisis of 1973 would change the trajectory of 
environmentalism in the United States.  In 1973, a bloc of oil producing countries 
(OPEC) substantially increased the prices of oil barrels. One of the reasons for this 
imposed embargo was listed as the sharp increase in the cost of U.S. food manufacturing 
exports (Rothschild 1976; Timmer 2010). This led to an economic crisis within the 
United States and other countries dependent on foreign oil to maintain their consumption 
practices and patterns. 
The food manufacturing industry was specifically linked to these developments 
in the 1970s and into the early 1980s. Designed to protect U.S. farming interests, annual 
U.S. farm bills allow government intervention in the production mechanisms. Although 
a domestic policy, the international ramifications included trade restrictions such as 
import controls and subsidies for exports. The federal government described these 
government interventions as support for family farms. However, U.S. industrialization of 
agriculture30 and continued dependence of family farms on the technological 
                                                 
30 Research in this area has examined the impacts of industrial transformation on rural 
and farming communities within the United States (Thomas, Howell, Wang, and 
Albrecht 1996; Albrecht 1997; Albrecht 1998). 
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developments of agro-business and the food manufacturing industry meant that most of 
the positive impacts of government protectionist policies profited mostly large 
corporations. While at the same time, increases in oil prices and by extension energy 
prices, made it more difficult for U.S. farmers to support their own smaller production 
(Friedman 1993).  Because of this scenario and the linkages between the U.S food trade 
policies and the oil embargo, the environmental ramifications of the oil crisis reduced 
public oil consumption as well as U.S oil dependence. In short, it created a significant 
opportunity for U.S. based oil companies.  
While from one perspective the oil crisis seemed to serve the interests of an 
increasingly environmental agenda; from the perspective of production, the OPEC oil 
embargo provided an opportunity for companies to shift public policy away from 
production regulations to more business-friendly policies.  High producing industries 
were now able to strongly condemn environmental regulations on production because 
these regulations reduced their ability to “compete with foreign competitors, reduced 
employment, and hurt profits (Kline 2011; 106).” Many local, state, and federal leaders 
rationalized the need to reduce environmental standards to support industry in increasing 
production (Melosi 1980). It was under this context that President Carter took office.  
By 1976, much of the public momentum around public environmentalism had 
decreased substantially31. The OPEC embargo was still on and the U.S. economy was in 
                                                 
31 Nevertheless, there continued to be environmental amendments that strengthened laws 
during the late 1970s and early 1980s. For example, the 1977 amendment to the Clean 
Water Act, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (1977), the National 
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the middle of a recession. The strategy of the Carter Administration was to focus on the 
side of consumption as opposed to production. The administration set fuel standards, 
limited the federal speed limits, attempted to regulate energy use through the creation of 
the Department of Energy, and tried to institute tax incentives for industries and 
individuals that practiced conservation. Many of the proposed tax reforms, however, did 
not pass congress (Kline 2011; 108).  President Carter’s support of powerful and 
influential environmental reformers through government appointments solidified their 
connection to the presidency. As a result, federal protective actions became increasingly 
disconnected from local environmental reforms32, which served to be detrimental as big 
business mobilized.  
While strategically moving the focus away from regulating production left little 
for industry to lobby against on the federal level. This created an opportunity for 
businesses to mobilize local groups against all forms of environmental regulation. As the 
Carter administration failed to engage local communities in their plans for reform, 
businesses utilized this opportunity. Coalitions led by the Business Roundtable 
systematically attacked environmental regulations coming out of all environmental 
                                                 
Energy Conservation Policy Act (1978), CERCLA (1980), the Fish and Wildlife 
Conservation Act(1980), and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (1982). 
 
32 There were some cases where local struggles were highlighted in the Carter 
Administration. One example was the “Love Canal Tragedy (Beck 1979),” where an 
entire neighborhood was found to have been built on a toxic dump site. Lois Gibbs, was 
a community member in the Love Canal area that led the way in bringing attention to 
this travesty. This work would eventually lead to the creation of the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) also 
known as Superfund.  
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departments. The EPA became the subject of much ridicule.  Businesses successfully 
argued that environmental regulations weakened the American economy because of the 
prohibitive costs associated with regulation, the hit to “business morale,” and the 
inefficiencies they caused (Gottlieb 2002; 184; Kline 2011).  Consequently, the Carter 
Administration’s strong environmental record backfired for both the presidency and the 
most powerful environmental organizations in the nation.  
The 1980s: Decreasing Environmental Support, Policy Rollbacks, and the New 
Environmental Justice Agenda 
With strong support from the big business and Americans coping with the 
economic recession, the Reagan administration was able to roll back much of the 
environmental progress of the 1960s and 1970s. The administration cut the budgets of 
government agencies such as the EPA and worked to reduce the reach of already 
established environmental regulations.33 During the early part of his presidency, Reagan 
appointed several conservative anti-environmentalists to key environmental positions in 
his administration. For example, James Watt, a huge supporter of utilizing open federal 
lands for mining, drilling, and ranching development, was appointed as the Secretary of 
the Interior (Kline 2011). Watt was influential in the appointment of, Ann Gorsuch 
Burford, a business attorney that had been committed to increasing state power in 
                                                 
33 The Environmental Education Act, which was promoted by the Nixon administration 
and established a government agency, later housed under the department of education, 
was one of the first to go in the early 1980s.  The goal of this law was to develop 
environmental education curricula and provide teachers with professional development. 
Although on the books until 1975, the program was defunded and then repealed in 1981 
(Shabecoff 1993).  
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environmental regulation enforcements, as the first female EPA administrator (Martin 
2004). In office for less than two years, Burford reduced the EPA’s budget by $200 
million, downsized staff, and reduced the number of cases against industry polluters.  By 
1983, both James Watt and Ann Gorsuch Burford34 resigned their posts because of 
controversy.  
The Reagan administration’s aggressive anti-environmentalism was a crisis for 
mainstream environmental organizations. Fractures between the large environmental 
organizations and states with large natural resource-based tourist attractions (e.g., 
national parks) were temporarily mended towards the end of pushing back a strong 
environmental agenda. During this time, the membership of the largest environmental 
organizations grew exponentially (Boyer et al. 2005). Chief Executive Officers of the 
Big 10 environmental organizations, saw an opportunity to develop a unified voice that 
was pro environmental and against the anti-environmentalism in the current federal 
government (Gottlieb 2002; 3). The Group of 10, as they were called, produced “An 
Environmental Agenda for the Future” and the “Blueprint for the Environment”, which 
solidified a unified approach to this crisis. This was a new opportunity to recommit to 
environmentalism, regain the support of the public by new grassroots efforts, and defend 
the system that had been put in place in the previous decades (Gottlieb 2002). Many of 
the mainstream environmental tactics were successful.   
                                                 
34 Burford was replaced by the first EPA administrator, William Ruckelhaus. The EPA 
had been developing as an enforcement bureaucracy and Ruckelhaus continued that 
tradition (Ember 1995). His key role was getting Congress to renew Superfund in 1986. 
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By the later part of the 1980s there was renewed support for environmental 
regulations. In 1986, Congress reauthorized the Safe Drinking Act and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right to Know Act, which encouraged the reporting of toxic 
releases from production facilities (Kline 2011). Furthermore, the public’s participation 
in the environmental agenda substantially increased. By 1985, membership in the top 10 
mainstream environmental organizations was at approximately 3.3 million people, up 
from 500,000 twenty years earlier (Kline 2011). Additionally, the amount of new 
environmental organizations and membership in those organizations grew as well. This 
would set the stage for the next several decades of information about toxic emissions and 
the growth of the environmental justice movement.  
By 1988, as part of the Community Right to Know Act, the EPA began to report 
findings of industrial pollution known to the public through the development of the 
Toxic Release Inventory. While the mainstream environmental organizations were busy 
developing a coherent environmental plan to counteract the anti-environmental backlash 
of the 1980s, environmental justice groups had also begun to develop the language (e.g., 
Not in my Backyard (NIMBY)) for the movement against disproportionate risks. Local 
communities were fighting back against industrial dumping and their increased risks of 
toxic emissions. The experiences of local communities being subject to environmental 
ills, were being documented more systematically. In Warren County, North Carolina 
community members documented the siting of a toxic waste landfill in an African 
American Community (Bullard 1990). By 1987, the United Church of Christ 
Commission for Racial Justice released a report that showed systematically how race 
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was the most important predictor of where toxic sites were located across the nation 
(Payne and Newman 2005). Key players in the movement strategized about using a civil 
rights framework and began packaging these experiences from the lens of 
antidiscrimination (Gottlieb 2002).  Although, these experiences were being 
documented, Environmental Justice did not become centered in national politics for 
another several years.  
The 1990s: Environmental Resurgence and the Centering of Environmental Justice 
 During the 1990s several competing environmental issues continued to gain 
momentum. Although they varied in scale and focus, they all showed an increase focus 
on environmental issues affecting the United States. In this section, I discuss the global 
environmental issues, the clean air amendment, the environmental connection to the food 
movement, and the federalization of the environmental justice movement.  
Large Scale Problems and International Solutions 
In the late 1980s two large scale environmental problems surfaced, global 
warming and ozone depletion. Scientists found that chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) gases, 
carried by CFC molecules were rising into the earth’s stratosphere and reducing the 
earth’s ozone layer (Kline 2011). To illustrate, a 1991 EPA study found that pollutants 
were depleting the ozone shield at twice the rate that scientists had previously predicted 
(Boyer et al. 2005). An international response was necessary, so in 1987, nations signed 
on to the Montreal protocol, which was a pledge to phase out the use of CFCs by the 
year 1999. Additionally, in 1988, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) scientists warned about the Earth’s greenhouse effect triggering global 
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warming, which would have a significant effect on rising sea levels as well as global 
climate change (Kline 2011). The U.S. was not quick to support making pro-
environmental changes based on these observations. In fact, legislation to reduce air 
pollution that were postulated to be associated with global warming was contentious. 
The federal government’s response to these two issues would have a direct impact on the 
way air emissions were regulated over the next several decades.  
By the end of the 1980s, air pollution had become a particularly dramatic 
problem in the United States. “In Louisiana alone, industry pumped 2 million pounds of 
pollutants into the air every day (Kline 2011; 118)”. By 1990, the largest industrial 
chemical users had “released some 4.8 billion pounds of 320 toxic chemicals into the air, 
water, or, land, or transferred these chemicals to treatment, storage, and disposal 
facilities (STDFs). 
Although the federal government’s response to the two large scale issues was 
mixed, these issues brought concerns about the environment back to the forefront of 
people’s minds. A New York Times/CBS survey of a sample of the U.S. population in 
1990 found that “74% of respondents supported protecting the environment regardless of 
cost, an increase from 31% in 1981 (Kline 2011; 118-119). Membership in the largest 
environmental organizations doubled in size and the 1990 Earth Day, the first nationally 
organized one since 1970, brought back the deluge of actors. Corporations used the 
event to capitalize on the resurgence of environmentalism in the population. This event 
“triggered a frenzy of green marketing” (Kline 2011; 122) that has become a mainstay of 
American corporate responsibility trademarks. Even the largest polluters (e.g., Polaroid, 
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Monsanto, British Petroleum, and Honeywell) were all successful in sponsoring different 
Earth Day celebrations across the country. For example, the largest sponsor for Boston 
events was Polaroid (Gottlieb 2002; 265; Cohen 1991).  
The Final Clean Air Act Amendment and the Centralization of Environmental Justice  
By 1990, the Clean Air Act Amendments were passed, placing stricter standards 
on air pollution. They called for “a significant reduction in the emissions that cause acid 
rain and smog, airborne toxic chemicals, and substances that deplete stratospheric 
ozone.” After years, of limited environmental support, this was a significant point in 
U.S. environmental history. With corporations interested in showing their support for 
pro environmental policies35, they were particularly invested in the passage of these 
amendments. To that end, they supported the amendment’s passage in so far as it “relied 
heavily on market incentives such as voluntary compliance credits and performance 
standards.”  Additionally, the Pollution Prevention Act focused on cost effective changes 
in “production, operation, and raw material use” to incentivize a shift into less emissions 
from production facilities (Kline 2011; 119-120). These laws expanded opportunities for 
buy-in from various groups including corporations, mainstream environmentalists, 
government environmental bureaucrats, and to some extent the radical environmental 
                                                 
35 This support was limited to domestic policies. During this time, several environmental 
treaties were presented and the U.S. was one nation that did not support most them. The 
Rio Conference in 1992 (Earth Summit) saw President Bush’s lack of support for these 
treaties from the position of harming American business interests (Kline 2011; 123). For 
example, although 160 nations signed the BioDiversity Treaty, the U.S. did not. 
Additionally, the countries represented could not agree on deadlines for curbing carbon 
dioxide emissions. (Kline 2011; Gottlieb 2002). 
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groups as well. These successes were temporary, however, as issues of disproportionate 
impacts of poor environmental behavior on poor and minority communities continued to 
surface. Furthermore, the lack of connection between environmental issues and issues 
around food and consumption made it particularly difficult to recognize the ways people 
were being impacted on multiple levels (Gottlieb 2002).36  
The relationship between environmentalists and food activists was particularly 
wrought. Environmentalists, in particular sought to differentiate their work against 
pesticide use and “other agricultural practices from issues such as support for local 
farmers. As seen during the debates over the 1995 Farm Bill37, environmentalists were 
less interested in corporate farming than the food industry restructuring and its impacts 
on workers and communities (Gottlieb 2002: 18). This relationship would significantly 
change during the early part of the 1990s.  By 1999, demonstrations at the Seattle World 
Trade Organization meeting linked food issues with environmental issues. The 
increasing visibility of the food movement made it strategically important for 
environmentalists to link themselves. Unlike the 1995 farm bill debates, the 2002 
debates around the farm bill saw linkages “with different food movements to save and 
                                                 
36 One exception to this was the Farm Bill of 1990, which included “several 
environmental provisions, including soil conservation, water quality, and other 
environmental impact questions that the national environmental groups had helped steer 
through Congress (Gottlieb 2002:17).” 
 
37 In debates over the Farming Bill, environmentalists showed a lack of support for the 
local farming movement.  
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extend environmental programs while providing support and building coalitions around 
other food related issues (Gottlieb 2002:19).”  
The development of linkages between food activists and environmentalists were 
occurring within a context of an administration prioritizing safeguarding manufacturing 
companies. In May of 1992, the U.S. Department of Labor announced that by the year 
2005 job opportunities would decline in 30 occupations, with more than half being 
manufacturing jobs.  To counteract this report, President Bush issued a moratorium in 
January 1992 on new regulations including those that affected the environment, 
purportedly to save American businesses money and protect employment. In April of 
that year, he extended the moratorium continuing the decline of environmental 
regulations at the federal level (CQ Researcher 1992).  At the same time, however, 
environmental justice activists and researchers became central to the growing 
environmental agenda. Funding sources slightly increased for activities and research 
associated with linking issues of race and environment as well as a new “risk 
discrimination policy infrastructure” that would have a significant impact on the 
language associated with this work (Gottlieb 2002: 269- 270).  
The People of Color Environmental Leadership Conference and its Aftermath 
A crucial point for the environmental justice movement in the U.S. was the 
People of Color Environmental Leadership Conference Summit in Washington D.C. in 
1992.  The planning of this summit incorporated various perspectives that all seemed to 
have a key place in the Environmental Justice agenda. These included questions of place 
as a marker for understanding the “governance of production decisions” around the 
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control of toxic emissions, dumping, and pollution in general. This summit developed a 
unified purpose, even as it continued to have questions around structure and uncertainty 
(Gottlieb 2002: 345). It was this summit, however, that would pave the way for the 
support of environmental justice by the Clinton Administration and the ability of this 
new alternative environmental movement to be taken seriously by mainstream 
environmental groups.  
In 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898, which committed the 
federal government in addressing inequalities in how federal environmental policies 
impacted minorities and low-income populations (Gottlieb 2002).  Although, 
environmental justice had been on the radar for several years, the movement never had 
the elevated power of other environmental issues (Kline 2011).  
Except for the executive order, the Clinton Administration steered away from 
promoting new environmental regulations. However, it did strongly support using the 
market to curb environmental ills perpetrated by big business. This moved government 
management of the environment away from clean up and control and more toward 
pollution prevention (Kline 2011). In 1994, Carol Browner proposed a Common-Sense 
Initiative that government work more closely with industry in forming environmental 
policy (EPA Journal 1995). Strategies included tax incentives and increasing taxes for 
certain anti-environmental activities (Kline 2011).  Corporations capitalized on this new 
business friendly environmental policy setting with their own focus on green marketing.  
Although environmental issues were once again seen as important in national 
policies, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) showed the fractures 
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within U.S. environmentalism. On the one hand, the mainstream environmental groups 
supported NAFTA and worked to get assurances from the Clinton Administration that 
any environmental issues to come out of this treaty would be addressed as well. One 
glaring exception among these groups was the Sierra Club who opposed NAFTA along 
with many anti-globalization activists representing food, labor, and environmental 
justice, to name a few (Gottlieb 2002: 21).  
The NAFTA dilemma showed the precarious position of environmentalism 
during the middle of the 1990s. While the 1980s saw environmental organizations 
working together against a commonly perceived threat, the loosening of the threat and 
the perception that the new presidential administration had a high esteem for 
environmental policies, caused new fissures to emerge. Environmental groups were 
conflicted about the Administration’s mixed results. While the 1994 budget supported 
increasing the study of natural and human influences on the environment as well as new 
environmental technology programs, the EPA’s budget was reduced by 540 million 
dollars (Kline 2011: 137). With mixed support of environmentalists and the 
Administration’s popularity rating very low, a Republican congress gained widespread 
support for its conservative agenda.38 In 1995, the House attempted to rewrite the 1972 
Clean Water Act. To moderate the more radical congressional regulatory reforms, 
                                                 
38 By 1994, there was a conservative resurgence against environment policy. Clinton 
proposed measures to overhaul laws governing mining on federal lands, to elevate the 
EPA administrator to the Cabinet, and to revamp the Superfund, the Clean Water Act 
and the Safe Drinking Water Act. None of which were supported by the 1994 Congress 
(Kline 2011). 
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President Clinton proposed a landmark package of twenty-five environmental reforms. 
Although there were small successes, most of these reforms did not pass. Nevertheless, 
in 1995, the EPA received a modest increase of $727 million.   
The Role of International Conferences on the Environment 
Beginning in the early 1990s, domestic and international environmental issues 
became intricately connected.39 As discussed earlier, countries realized that large scale 
problems such as ozone depletion and climate change could only be solved with 
cooperation among various nations. Furthermore, because of increasing globalization, 
environmental decisions that occurred abroad could have a direct effect on American 
industry (Kline 2011). For example, in a letter written by Al Gore to the U.S. State 
department, he outlined the interconnections of environmental policy with American 
diplomacy (Gore 1997).  
While the Bush administration was less interested in supporting international 
treaties regarding the environment, arguably the most important event in 
environmentalism during the second term of the Clinton Administration was the 
Climate-Change Conference held in Kyoto, Japan.40  During this Conference, Clinton 
proposed a Joint Implementation plan, linking business investments with greenhouse gas 
                                                 
39 One example of these connections was the World Sustainable Development 
Conference in Johannesburg, where the environmental justice activists numbered in the 
hundreds resulting in both the language and issues associated with environmental justice 
becoming figured prominently in several of the sessions. 
 
40 Other important milestones during the Clinton’s second term included Congress 
strengthening pesticide regulation and the EPA implementing new air quality standards 
as well as creating a “superfund” to clean up hazardous waste sites.  
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emissions. (Kline 2011; Clinton 1997). The Kyoto Protocol required the industrialized 
(developing countries were exempted) countries to cut their carbon emissions. Although 
President Clinton signed the protocol in 1998, by 1999 the U.S. Senate still had not 
passed it.  
By 1999, U.S. Foreign policy on the environment deprioritized multilateral 
agreements with the U.S. opposing proposals on limiting flexible mechanisms under the 
Kyoto protocol as well as the development of an international fund for environmental 
crises. Instead, the U.S. pursued bilateral agreements with countries of economic interest 
and took that approach to environmental changes as well. This approach satisfied 
business interests and the hope was to “convince such industries that being 
environmentally friendly could also be profitable” (Kline 2011: 162).  Although, 
moderate in its approach, the Clinton Administration continued a consistent support for 
environmental reform. The beginning of the 2000s would shift this support considerably.  
The 2000s: Decreased Environmental Regulation and its Aftermath (2001 -2010) 
Any advances of environmentalism and the environmental justice movement in 
the 1990s became significantly less important early in the new decade. Priorities of the 
United States and around the globe changed on September 11, 2001. The federal 
government focused on homeland security and the War on Terrorism. It created an 
exogenous shock that served to deprioritize any environmental changes. While the 
government and the overall public supported the shift towards protecting the United 
States from potential terrorist threats, the Bush administration quietly used the 
opportunity to significantly impact environmental policies.  
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In his first three years in office, Bush appointed industry-connected individuals 
with interests in weakening environmental standards to key posts in his administration. 
This included Marianne L. Horinko as administrator of the EPA.  Prior to her 
appointment, Horinko served as the President of Clay and Associates, a consulting firm 
that represented industry clients regulated by the EPA (Kline 2011).  Additionally, Bush 
announced that he would not implement proposed EPA measures to reduce carbon 
dioxide emissions from power plants and even created an order that permitted higher 
levels of arsenic in drinking water (Boyer et al. 2005).  
The following numbers illustrate the extent and impact of environmental 
deregulation during this time. Federal lawsuits against companies violating 
environmental laws declined by 75% between the Clinton and Bush administration. By 
2004, criminal prosecution had been reduced by 17%, civil citations had been reduced 
by 57%. The Superfund tax for polluting industries was not renewed, which caused 34 
superfund sites in 19 different states to go unfunded. The EPA showed 52% decrease in 
clean air inspections and a 68% reduction in the number of violations submitted to 
refineries across the country (Kline 2011). After years of consistent decline, the Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) showed an increase of 5 percent in the release of toxic 
substances into the air, water, and land.   
President Bush’s lack of support for environmental developments was evident in 
his insistence on withdrawing from any negotiations regarding the Kyoto Protocol 
because of the “potential strain that he believed the treaty would put on the economy” 
(Kline 2011: 174).  The mainstream environmental groups criticized the administration 
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and were powerless to have any real impact because of the larger perceived threats 
looming around war and public safety (Boyer et al. 2005). Without support at the 
national level, locally based environmental and environmental justice groups focused 
their efforts on more specific initiatives on the local, state, and regional levels (Gottlieb 
2002).   
 Seven years into the second decade of the 21st century, the struggle between 
business interests, mainstream environmentalists, environmental justice activists, and 
government regulations continue. These relationships, however have been directly 
impacted by the history outlined in this chapter. For example, the EPA’s Toxic Release 
Inventory has become an increasingly valuable resource for analyzing environmental 
inequalities. It has also served to provide legitimacy to claims of disproportionality in 
toxic emissions. Furthermore, this legitimacy has spilled over into the work of the 
mainstream environmental organizations with organizations such as the Sierra Club 
putting out information about how race impacts emissions.  
 From the perspective of organizations, businesses have developed very strategic 
marketing programs to show their environmental support. Corporate environmental 
responsibility has become a buzzword and a way for corporations to market themselves 
to an environmentally conscious public. Within the food industry, specifically, 
environmental degradation, organic processing, ethical farming, and worker treatment 
have all become connected issues. At the same time, it is notable that many of the largest 
corporations no longer manufacture their goods in the United States.  The ones that are  
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left, however, still produce toxic emissions.  A large amount of toxic waste associated 
with industry is not the exception but the rule in American (and global) capitalism and so 
clarity around where they are located within the United States and who are most at risk 
for this harm are particularly important to determine.  
The table below shows the prevalence of toxic emissions for all industries as well 
as the food manufacturing industry since the TRI began collecting data.41 
  
                                                 
41 Over this period, chemicals were added to the core chemical list. Emissions for the 
years 1988-1990 use the 1988 core chemical list. Emissions for the years 1991-1994 use 
the 1991 core chemical list. Emissions for the years 1995-1997 use the 1995 core 
chemical list. Emissions for the years 1998-1999 use the 1998 core chemical list. 
Emissions for 2000 use the core chemical list for that year. Emissions for the years 
2001-2010 use the 2001 core chemical list. Emissions for the years 2011-2016 use the 
2011 core chemical list. Of note is that no chemicals were added to the list of toxic 
chemicals for the entire presidency of George W. Bush.  
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Table 1: Total Food Industry and All Industry Toxic Emissions 1988-2016 
 
Year  
Total Emissions 
(All Industries)  
Total Emissions     
(Food Industry)  
Percent of Total 
Emissions 
1988 2,985,745,772 9,114,601 0.31% 
1989 2,727,839,836 8,719,594 0.32% 
1990 2,531,917,614 6,443,936 0.25% 
1991 2,205,199,402 7,557,623 0.34% 
1992 2,047,902,485 8,253,040 0.40% 
1993 1,846,766,621 7,045,884 0.38% 
1994 1,832,515,827 6,035,909 0.33% 
1995 2,493,865,782 126,391,555 5.07% 
1996 2,452,156,724 121,019,902 4.94% 
1997 2,692,684,146 122,220,918 4.54% 
1998 6,734,482,931 130,041,623 1.93% 
1999 6,897,093,531 135,043,551 1.96% 
2000 6,286,908,961 131,996,555 2.10% 
2001 5,587,593,432 138,556,612 2.48% 
2002 4,745,852,144 146,324,522 3.08% 
2003 4,444,461,416 137,634,346 3.10% 
2004 4,233,680,951 151,711,811 3.58% 
2005 4,361,242,653 147,441,506 3.38% 
2006 4,330,575,366 144,973,325 3.35% 
2007 4,130,959,276 141,627,620 3.43% 
2008 3,887,442,756 147,553,214 3.80% 
2009 3,396,965,067 129,966,690 3.83% 
2010 3,813,550,660 127,761,373 3.35% 
2011 4,115,437,132 123,938,429 3.01% 
2012 3,617,991,858 126,535,009 3.50% 
2013 4,119,026,930 126,056,257 3.06% 
2014 3,905,379,163 128,968,144 3.30% 
2015 3,346,569,933 123,719,260 3.70% 
2016 3,415,093,368 120,847,408 3.54% 
 
 The beginning of the Trump administration has seen much of the environmental 
advances of the last two decades rolled back. The lasting impact of these rollbacks are 
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yet to be seen, but the changes in the EPA priorities will likely mean significant 
decreases in environmental justice initiatives along with pollution abatement policies.  
The remainder of this dissertation will seek to explain this phenomenon in some 
detail. In the next chapter, I will focus specifically on the differences in community 
demographics surrounding food manufacturing facilities, develop a standardized social 
vulnerability score, and use geographic information systems (GIS) to analyze differences 
in populations’ risk from toxic emissions across the United States.  
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CHAPTER IV 
SOCIAL VULNERABILITY THEORY, METHODOLOGY, AND METHODS 
This chapter provides an overview of social vulnerability and focuses specifically 
on how this area of research relates to the risk associated with a particular population’s 
proximity to food manufacturing facilities. In the first section, I discuss social 
vulnerability as a concept. The following sections delve further into the research design 
for the vulnerability mapping portion of this dissertation as well as the methods used to 
develop a social vulnerability score for use in the multilevel modeling discussed in later 
chapters.  
Social Vulnerability  
 As a reaction to 1970s research on risks and hazards that spent little or no time 
engaging in the role of human agency (Cutter 2016), vulnerability research focuses on 
the disproportionate risk to hazards experienced by certain groups over others. Based in 
political economy (Wisner 2016), vulnerability scholars began to think about the role of 
socio-economic status, gender, race, and ethnicity (Cutter 2016) in a population 
experiencing harm.  
Although the concept of vulnerability is widely used, there is considerable 
variation in its uses. Cutter (1996: 530) defines social vulnerability as the “susceptibility 
of social groups or society at large to potential losses.” It considers social inequalities in 
order to understand environmental risks posed to certain groups of individuals (Cutter 
1996; Blaikie et al. 1994). A population’s social vulnerability affects its access to 
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information, financial resources, political capital, and social networks (Van Zandt et al. 
2012) and can also affect their perception of their vulnerability (Brody et al. 2008). 
 Social vulnerability as a measurement includes various characteristics, many of 
which are found in the environmental justice literature. For example, characteristics are 
as varied as racial and ethnic categorization (Wilson 1987; Zahran et al. 2008), capacity 
for collective action, (Hamilton 1995), population density (Stockwell et al. 1993; Rogge 
1998), a community’s relationship to local infrastructure (Gasser and Snitofsky 1990; 
Platt 1991), poverty levels (Zahran et al. 2008), educational and income levels (Cutter 
1996), and gender (Cutter 2017). For the most part, social vulnerability is conceptualized 
as a continuum where being on the low end of having social resources means having a 
higher level of social vulnerability. However, depending on the hazard and its context, 
specific factors can mitigate vulnerability as well (Cutter 1996; Cutter, Boruff, and 
Shirley 2003 Rogge 1998).  For example, living in a poorer neighborhood may mean 
higher vulnerability to toxic emissions if there are manufacturing plants that are actually 
sited in the neighborhood. However, organizations may choose to have facilities in 
working class rather than the poorest neighborhoods.  
 The larger societal and organizational forces that impact the overall vulnerability 
of a population are the least studied within both the environmental justice and social 
vulnerability literature (Cutter 2003). However, researchers have examined some causes 
of these vulnerabilities such as the underlying social conditions that are separate from 
the physical vulnerability or hazard exposure itself. Scholars working in this area have 
argued that the interplay of larger structural forces including economic, political,  
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political economy characteristics (Watts and Bohle 1993; Blaikie et al. 1994; Peacock 
and Ragsdale 1997; Peacock, Dash, and Zhang 2007), and a history of politically 
motivated segregation (Peacock and Girard 1997) as well as their interactions with 
biophysical characteristics and probabilities of exposure to hazards (Alexander 1993; 
Highfield, Peacock, and Van Zandt 2014) are important to understanding causal 
mechanisms.  
Arguing that socially created variables are the least studied, Cutter, Boruff, and 
Shirley (2003) proposed a social vulnerability index that takes into account demographic 
and socioeconomic data.  Factors included in this index include socioeconomic status, 
gender, race and ethnicity, age, commercial and industrial development, employment 
loss, rural/urban, residential property, infrastructure and lifelines, renters, occupation, 
family structure, education, population growth, medical services, social dependence, and 
special-needs populations. They found that the factors that contribute to the overall score 
varied depending on the area of the United States (Tiefenbacher, Konopka, and Shelley 
1997; Cutter and Solecki 1996). Additionally, while some components increase 
vulnerability, others moderated the effects.  The remainder of this chapter will describe a 
process of developing social vulnerability scores for this context.  
Vulnerability Mapping: Research Design  
In recent years, environmental justice researchers have incorporated spatial 
modeling to strengthen their work in determining environmental inequality (Anderton et 
al. 1994; Downey 2006; Mohai and Saha 2007; Mohai and Saha 2015). Pastor, Sadd, 
and Morello-Frosch (2004) used geographic information systems (GIS) to determine 
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proximity using the radii around toxic plants and found that there was a disproportionate 
exposure to toxic air releases by populations of color with the “unit-hazard 
methodology.” They used census tracts and calculated proximity by including data for an 
entire census tract if any portion of a tract, no matter how small, was in the distance 
buffers around plants. Consequently, a population could be relatively far from the actual 
plant, but would still be considered in close proximity.  Three years later, Mohai and 
Saha (2007) used a similar technique (i.e., areal apportionment method), except instead 
of including an entire tract, they measured the proportion of the tract located within the 
distance buffer. If a percentage of the population was located within this buffer, then 
data from the tract was apportioned and included in the radial area around the plant. 
These kinds of refinements in the analysis of exposure risk are especially important 
because scholars have found that the correlation between variables on the community-
level changes with spatial sampling to produce very different results simply because of 
the geographic units being used (Cutter 1996; Hodgson and Cutter 2001).  I take these 
issues into account when conducting my spatial analysis.   
 I used GIS mapping to determine the proximity of socially vulnerable 
populations to food manufacturing plants.  In line with the studies discussed above, I 
mapped food manufacturing plants that reported to the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory in 2010.  The following is a visual representation of 
facilities across the United States. The green dots are where the facilities are located.42 
                                                 
42 In many areas of the country, the green dots represent several facilities depending on 
how close they are together.  
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Appendix A provides visual representations of each of the 10 EPA regions within the 
United States.  
Figure 1: Map of TRI Food Manufacturing Facilities in the U.S. (2010) 
 
Table 2 shows the number of facilities located in each state within the analysis.43  
  
                                                 
43 The facilities in Table 2 were the ones for which accurate longitude and latitude were 
available.  
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Table 2: TRI Food Manufacturing Facilities in the U.S. (2010) 
 
EPA Region State Number of Facilities 
Percentage of 
Facilities by Region 
1  27  
 Connecticut 3 13.0 
 Maine 6 26.1 
 Massachusetts 9 39.1 
 New Hampshire 1 4.4 
 Rhode Island 0 0.0 
 Vermont 4 4.0 
    
2  46  
 New Jersey 11 23.9 
 New York 35 76.1 
    
3  101  
 Delaware 11 10.9 
 Pennsylvania 43 42.6 
 Virginia 26 25.7 
 West Virginia 3 2.9 
 Maryland 18 17.8 
    
4  228  
 Alabama 27 11.8 
 Florida 21 9.2 
 Georgia 41 17.9 
 Kentucky 27 11.8 
 Mississippi 24 10.5 
 North Carolina 47 20.6 
 South Carolina 13 5.7 
 Tennessee 28 12.3 
    
5  204  
 Illinois 39 19.1 
 Indiana 30 14.7 
 Michigan 28 13.7 
 Minnesota 57 27.9 
 Ohio 37 18.1 
 Wisconsin 13 6.4 
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Table 2 
(cont.) 
 
EPA Region State Number of Facilities 
Percentage of 
Facilities by Region 
6    
 
 Arkansas 40 29.2 
 Louisiana 15 10.9 
 New Mexico 6 4.4 
 Oklahoma 16 11.7 
 Texas 60 43.8 
    
7  131  
 Iowa 53 40.5 
 Kansas 19 14.5 
 Missouri 42 32.1 
 Nebraska 17 12.9 
    
8  25  
 Colorado 9 36.0 
 Montana 2 8.0 
 North Dakota 1 4.0 
 South Dakota 5 20.0 
 Utah 7 28.0 
 Wyoming 1 4.0 
    
9  83  
 Arizona 5 6.0 
 California 76 91.6 
 Hawaii 1 1.2 
 Nevada 1 1.2 
    
10  49  
 Idaho 18 38.3 
 Oregon 9 19.2 
 Washington 20 42.6 
 Alaska 2 4.1 
Total  1,031  
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 In line with Mohai and Saha (2007), I plotted population characteristics using 1-, 
2-, and 3- mile buffers around the plant location.44 I used an areal apportionment 
method,45 which calculates the proportion of the geographic unit that falls within the 
buffer and weights the population characteristics according to that proportion.46  Once all 
population characteristics were plotted, I constructed social vulnerability scores for each 
area and radius.  Proportional characteristics were calculated for every time the area fell 
within the buffer of a facility.  
Figure 2: A Portion of New York State Facilities with Added Buffers (2010) 
 
 
                                                 
44 Currie and colleagues (2013) found that toxic emissions from plants have been 
detected up to one mile away by pollution monitoring stations. They also found that 
significant differences in health risks and housing values occurred between households 
that are less than one mile from a plant and those located 1 to 2 miles away from a plant. 
 
45 See Appendix B for steps taken to utilize the areal apportionment method for data 
analysis. 
 
46 Communities may be calculated more than once if they fall into the buffer zone of 
more than one plant. 
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Constructing Social Vulnerability Scores  
 To construct social vulnerability scores using the demographic characteristics of 
the populations around each of the 1,031 plants in the United States for 2010, I began 
with a list of eleven widely used variables in the social vulnerability and environmental 
justice literature.  I collected data for all variables from the 2010 Decennial Census and 
the 2008-2012 American Community Survey. As discussed earlier in this chapter, these 
characteristics have, to varying degrees, all been suggested as important indicators of 
environmental inequality and vulnerability. They include: age (Cutter, Mitchell, and 
Scott 2000), sex (Blaikie et al. 1994), race (Mohai et al. 2009), ethnicity (Pastor et al. 
2001), marital status (Blaikie et al. 1994), home ownership (Morrow 1999), poverty 
(Gould 1986), educational attainment (Been 1994a, Smith 2007), disability (Morrow 
1999), and unemployment (Bezdek 1995). Table 3 shows the measurements used for 
each of the variables identified. Measurements were determined by considering what 
was used in previous studies as well as based on data availability.  
Table 3: Variables and Measurements for Social Vulnerability Score 
Variables  Measurements 
Age Percent Minors (less than 17 years of age) 
Age Percent Elderly (greater than 65 years of age) 
Sex Percent Female  
Race Percent nonwhite 
Ethnicity  Percent Hispanic (includes both white and nonwhite) 
Marital Status Percent Unmarried  
Home Ownership Percent Homes occupied by the owner 
Poverty Percent Below poverty level ($10,380 in 2010) 
Schooling Percent adults no high school (greater than 25 years of age) 
Disability Percent Disabled 
Unemployment Percent Unemployed  
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In determining which of the variables made the most sense as components to the 
social vulnerability score, I used two related techniques. First, I calculated bivariate 
correlations for the measurements. Since, I assume that all the measurements are a part 
of social vulnerability, I would expect that they are at least moderately correlated (.300 
or higher). I used higher correlations as an indicator that the variables could be used 
together in the development of a social vulnerability score. Table 4 shows the correlation 
matrix.  
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix for Proposed Variables in the Social Vulnerability Score 
 Female 
Un-
employed Disabled  
No high 
school  
Below 
poverty  
Owner 
Occupied  Un-married  Elderly  Minors 
 
Hispanic  
           
Female 1          
Unemployed 0.839 1         
Disabled  0.732 0.843 1        
No high school  0.854 0.825 0.699 1       
Below Poverty  0.424 0.475 0.458 0.451 1      
Owner Occupied 0.659 0.592 0.682 0.731 0.286 1     
Unmarried  0.836 0.875 0.794 0.937 0.565 0.687 1    
Elderly  0.804 -0.740 0.734 0.777 0.343 0.703 0.763 1   
Minors 0.139 0.141 0.140 0.090 0.164 0.120 0.149 0.112 1  
 Hispanic 0.380 0.393 0.194 0.397 0.156 0.086 0.371 0.240 0.001 1 
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From a quick glance at the correlation matrix, it was clear that the variable 
measuring minors was only weakly correlated to the other variables.  Before, I decided 
to reduce the data by removing percent minors, I verified the weak correlation more 
systematically.  
The second technique I used to determine which measurements would become 
parts of the social vulnerability score was common factor analysis using STATA. This 
analysis is based on shared co-variation. It is designed to explain all the variance 
between factors and to help identify all the variance components that could potentially 
make up a specific scale or index (Acock 2010; Treiman 2010).  The factor loadings are 
used to assess the degree to which each variable is correlated with a specific factor. 
Ideally, all of the variables would load highly on a single factor.  In this case, the factor 
is social vulnerability with all of the variables’ measurements that are loaded strongly. 
The eigenvalue for the factor was 6.41 compared to an eigenvalue of 1.2 of the second 
factor. This shows a strong first factor.  The following scree plot provides a visual 
comparison of the eigenvalue for the first factor compared to other factors.  
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Figure 3: Scree Plot of Eigenvalues by factor
 
 Table 5 shows the loadings for the strongest factor.  This factor accounts for 58 
percent of the variance of the 11 items.  
Table 5: Factor Loadings from Common Factor Analysis 
 
Variable Factor 1 
Percent Female 0.913 
Percent Unemployed 0.932 
Percent Disabled 0.858 
Percent No high school 0.931 
Percent Below poverty 0.557 
Percent Owner occupied 0.741 
Percent Unmarried 0.961 
Percent Nonwhite 0.642 
Percent Elderly 0.844 
Percent Minors 0.170 
Percent Hispanic 0.412 
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According to Treiman (2010), a factor loading of more than .4 is a good indicator of a 
component’s relationship with the factor. With a factor loading of less than .4, the 
common factor analysis confirmed that the percent minors measure was the only 
variable/component not strongly connected to the factor.47  
After removing percent minors from the list of components, there were 10 
variables that made up the social vulnerability score.  This factor accounts for 64 percent 
of the variance of the 10 items.  The omega reliability coefficient for this factor is .87. 
Table 6 shows the factor loadings after percent minors was removed from the list. 
Table 6: Factor Loadings from Common Factor Analysis Without Percent Minors  
 
Variable Factor 1 
Percent Female .912 
Percent Unemployed  .932 
Percent Disabled .858 
Percent No high school  .933 
Percent Below poverty .555 
Percent Owner occupied .741 
Percent Unmarried .961 
Percent Nonwhite .642 
Percent Elderly .844 
Percent Hispanic .414 
 
In line with Cutter et al (2003), I standardized each variable using z-score 
standardization: z = x-µ /σ. Z-scores are calculated by determining how many standard 
deviations the actual observation is from the mean for the variable. Once the variables 
                                                 
47 Using an assumption that the factors were correlated with one another, I ran an 
oblique rotation. The first two factors were positively correlated with one another.  
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were standardized, I calculated social vulnerability scores by adding the values for each 
variable together.48 Distinct social vulnerability scores were calculated for each distance 
around each facility: one mile, two miles, and three miles.   Table 7 shows the 
descriptive statistics for the social vulnerability scores by distance.  
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Social Vulnerability Score by Distance 
 
Social Vulnerability 
Scores  
Total 
Observations 
minimum 
score  
maximum 
score 
Mean 
score  
Standard 
Deviation  
      
One mile 1027 -14.295 25.282 -0.906 8.517 
Two mile 1036 -14.295 25.323 1.018 8.055 
Three mile  1036 -14.295 24.933 -0.121 7.855 
Total  3099 -14.295 25.323 -3.680 8.186 
 
Social Vulnerability and Toxic Emissions 
Using the social vulnerability scores that were derived from the process outlined 
above, I conducted two bivariate regressions to analyze the relationship between 
vulnerability scores and emissions from food manufacturing facilities. The first 
dependent variable (i.e., air emissions) is categorical and ordinal and captures the total 
emissions from each facility. The second variable (i.e., risk of emissions) is dichotomous 
and captures the risk associated with the facilities’ emissions. This variable was 
                                                 
48 In addition to a simple sum of all the scores, I also created a social vulnerability score 
that used a proportion of each variable using the factor loadings from the principal 
components analysis. In conducting the regression analyses discussed in the next 
chapter, I compared the findings from both sets of scores and there were no significant 
differences.  
  
75 
 
developed using TRI RSEI scores and includes toxicity measures for each of the 
chemicals within the emissions. I discuss these procedures in more detail in Chapter 5.   
Since neither of the dependent variables in the analyses are continuous variables, 
ordinary least squares regression was inappropriate. Instead, for the risk variable, I 
utilized a logistic regression model, p =
𝑒𝑎+𝑏1  𝑋1
1+𝑒
𝑎+𝑏1 𝑋1
  , and for the emissions variable I 
utilized an ordered logistic regression model,  𝑃𝑟 = (𝑘𝑖−1 < 𝑏1𝑋1 + 𝑏2𝑋2 +  𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑘  +
 𝑢𝑗  ≤  𝑘𝑖). These analyses set the foundation for the multilevel analysis described in the 
following chapter.   
The bivariate relationship between the social vulnerability score and the amount 
of emissions (in pounds) is significant and negative, r = -.016 with significance at  
p >0.00. In other words, for each increase in the social vulnerability score, the 
odds of a facility having higher emissions rates decreased by 1.6%. This means that a 
facility with the highest level of emissions is 6.4% less likely to be impacted by a 
community’s social vulnerability than a facility at the lowest level of emissions.  On the 
other hand, the bivariate relationship between the social vulnerability score and whether 
or not the facility had risky emissions was positive, r = .007 with significance at p>0.05.  
In other words, for each increase in the social vulnerability score, the odds of a facility 
having risky emissions is .7% higher. Considering the social vulnerability scores have a 
wide range (-14.295 to 25.323),  the difference in the odds of risky emissions for social 
vulnerability scores that are negative (little or no social vulnerability) and the odds of 
risky emissions for social vulnerability scores that are positive (more social 
vulnerability) is considerable. Although these r values are small, when interpreted they 
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show that the changes are potentially significant. Furthermore, this tells us that there are 
other influences occurring that affect this relationship, which makes the case for 
continuing with the multilevel analysis.  
Concluding Remarks 
In the next chapter, I detail my use of multilevel models to measure the 
differential impacts of organizational and contextual characteristics on the relationship 
between toxic air emissions from food manufacturing facilities and populations’ social 
vulnerability. 
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CHAPTER V 
MULTILEVEL MODELING OF TOXIC EMISSIONS: HYPOTHESES AND 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 In the previous chapter, I discussed social vulnerability theory and the 
methodology and methods I used in the creation of a social vulnerability score. The last 
part of the chapter focused on the social vulnerability scores and their relationship to the 
emissions (i.e. amount and level of risk) from food manufacturing facilities. However, 
social vulnerability does not spontaneously occur. Larger contextual variables impact 
how social vulnerability relates to any given hazard. An organizational political 
economy of the environment framework (discussed in Chapter 2) takes these larger 
contextual variables into account. I used a multilevel analysis that models these 
theoretical relationships. In this chapter, I outline and discuss my hypotheses and 
describe in detail the research design used to test them.    
Hypotheses  
 The multilevel analyses begin with the assumption that plant-level behavior is 
connected to complexities at all levels of society. Based on findings from research in 
environmental justice and hazards, I expected to find that social vulnerability scores, 
which combine several characteristics deemed important predictors of a neighborhood’s 
ability to anticipate, cope with, and respond to a toxic release, are predictors of the 
amount and level of risky emissions of local manufacturing plants. Furthermore, 
organizational and state characteristics influence the degree of relevance for various 
dimensions of social vulnerability.  
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Variations in Social Vulnerability   
 For the first research question, “Are socially vulnerable populations at a 
disproportionate risk for being affected by emissions from food manufacturing 
industries?” I developed one hypothesis.49  
Social Vulnerability Hypothesis  
 Research within the environmental justice tradition has found that race and class 
are significant predictors for the location of polluting facilities as well as their toxic 
emissions (Bullard 1983; Gelobter 1992; Mohai and Bryant 1992; Brown 1995; Downey 
1998; Ringquist 1997; Stretesky and Lynch 2002; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 2009). 
Fewer, but a still considerable number of studies have noted that in addition to race and 
class, other socioeconomic variables, including types of employment and housing prices 
have a real effect on creating these inequalities (Hird and Reese 1998; Smith 2007; 
Downey 2005).  With this in mind, my first hypothesis is as follows:  
H1) The higher a community’s social vulnerability score, the higher odds having risky 
emissions from food manufacturing plants.  
 
Mediating Hypotheses 
 
The second research question asks, “How do organizational and political-
economic factors affect the relationship between a community’s social vulnerability and 
the toxic emissions of local plants?” To answer this question, I examined the 
                                                 
49 I am interested mainly in the populations’ risk of exposure to the chemicals released 
from local facilities. However, since I used a toxicity measure as my dependent variable 
and since I assumed increased toxicity to be related to adverse health, I am also 
indirectly testing the populations’ increased risk of more severe health consequences.   
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interaction/mediating effects between social vulnerability and other context-level 
variables. The following hypotheses focus on the mediating influences of certain 
variables on the relationship between social vulnerability and plant-level emissions.  
Social Vulnerability-Community Organization Hypotheses 
 From one perspective, researchers have found that increases in the number of 
community organizations signals increased investment in the community by its members 
(Putnam 2001; Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin 1998; Tolbert et al. 2002). The existence of 
these organizations leads to increased community cohesion and a higher potential for 
community mobilization in response to an increased risk to the health and well-being of 
the local population. Additionally, researchers have found that the existence of non-
profit and church organizations in a local community is correlated with lesser industrial 
emissions (Grant and Jones 2001; Grant, Jones, and Trautner 2004; Touché 2012). From 
another perspective, scholars have argued that because of class, race, and ethnic 
divisions, community organizations serve to decrease community cohesion (Kadushin et 
al. 2005). Furthermore, communities and community organizations have competing 
interests and competing agendas as well as unequal power to organize for environmental 
protection (Pellow 2004). For example, a community organization focused on economic 
development is likely to have more power than a community organization focused on 
environmental justice. In cases where their goals run in conflict with one another, 
economic development will likely win out. Taking these nuances into account, I 
hypothesized that the number of community organizations present in a local area will 
impact the relationship between social vulnerability and the plant-level emissions. Since 
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I did not hypothesize a direction for this hypothesis, I used a two-tailed statistical test. 
Additionally, I hypothesized that the number of environmental organizations will have a 
direct positive effect on that relationship.  
H2) More community organizations strengthen the relationship between plant-level risky 
emissions and social vulnerability. 
 
H3) More environmental organizations in a community weaken the relationship between 
plant-level risky emissions and social vulnerability. 
 
Social Vulnerability-Organizational Characteristics Hypotheses 
Researchers have studied the relationship between organizational size and 
pollution. On the firm-level, researchers suggest that innovation of production processes 
is potentially riskier for larger companies (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Fryer and 
Versteeg 2008) so they may produce more pollution.  On the other hand, current 
research on pollution and corporations has shown that larger firms pollute at lower 
rates.50  It suggests that this relationship exists because larger firms are more visible, 
tend to be more accountable for their actions to the public, and have the financial 
resources to spend money on pollution abatement technologies (Ambec and Lanoie 
2008; Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016).  I hypothesized along with this 
line of research that the size of a plant’s parent company has a direct impact, either 
positive or negative, on the relationship between a plant’s emissions and the 
community’s social vulnerability.  
H4) The larger the parent company, the stronger the relationship between plant-level 
risky emissions and social vulnerability.  
                                                 
50 Rates refer to the amount of organizational pollution standardized by the size (usually 
measured by number of employees, sales, or assets) of the organization. 
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 In addition to size, researchers have also found that an organization’s complexity 
has a direct impact on organizational behavior. Prechel and Istvan (2016) found that for 
each additional subsidiary layer and for each additional facility within a corporate 
structure, emissions increased. A complex corporate structure creates a liability firewall 
(Prechel 1997; Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016), where a parent 
company is less legally liable for the actions of their subsidiaries. This creates a 
disincentive for parent companies to maintain tight controls over the decision making for 
smaller facilities in their corporate family and means that decision making may more 
likely be allocated to the local facility. On the other hand, as with size, larger companies 
are more visible to the public and therefore can be more impacted by public opinion in 
their corporate decision making (Prechel and Istvan 2016). Along with this line of 
thinking, I hypothesized that facilities that have a parent company will have less 
emissions than independent facilities. Additionally, facilities with a parent company will 
have less variations in emissions and risk based on the social vulnerability of the local 
population than independent facilities.    
H5) Independent facilities will have a stronger impact on the relationship between plant-
level risky emissions and social vulnerability than facilities with a parent company.  
  
Social Vulnerability-State Characteristics Hypotheses 
Research has reported that political-legal arrangements have a significant impact 
on organizational behavior (Prechel 2000). The legal environment under which 
corporations operate influences the strategies they undertake as well as the structures 
they develop. Additionally, research has found that, based on the hope of economic 
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development, local community governments may provide plants with incentives to move 
to certain neighborhoods (Cole and Foster 2001). In turn, corporations locate their plants 
in certain areas in return for tax breaks and lax environmental regulations (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1988; Szasz and Meuser 1997; Broadway 2000). Additionally, local 
populations themselves may welcome high polluting industries because they assume job 
opportunities will be created (Yandle and Burton 1996). These findings lead me to 
hypothesize that plants in regional states, which place a greater emphasis on creating a 
successful business climate, will have greater emission rates regardless of the level of 
social vulnerability of the local population.  
H6) The relationship between plant-level risky emissions and social vulnerability is 
weaker in states with stronger business climates.  
 
Further, scholars have examined how the environmental reputation of the state in 
which a plant is located has a significant effect on its toxic emissions. Plants located in 
states with stronger environmental reputations have fewer emissions (Prechel and 
Touché 2014; Prechel and Istvan 2016). Greater emphasis on environmental reputation 
in certain states may lead to higher standards for polluting plants and a greater likelihood 
of negative community response to a plant’s poor environmental behavior (Soule 2009; 
King and Pearce 2010). Still, research from the environmental justice literature asserts 
that plants located in minority communities may have lower reputational risk based on 
their poor environmental records (Lavelle and Coyle 1992; Zimmerman 1993). This may 
make them more likely, in states with a positive environmental reputation, to be sited in 
locations with more socially vulnerable populations. The combination of these research 
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findings suggest that plants in regional states with a good environmental reputation will 
have emission rates that are impacted by their location.   
H7) The relationship between plant-level risky emissions and social vulnerability is 
stronger in states with stronger environmental records  
 
Research Design  
 
The research design is an innovative approach to combining environmental 
justice and organizational research. It brings together several factors that indicate social 
vulnerability and analyzes its relationship with the toxic emissions from a manufacturing 
facility. Additionally, it captures the context in which this relationship exists. While 
other studies have looked at the relationship between many of the contextual 
independent variables and emissions, none have focused on how these contextual 
variables affect the relationship between social vulnerability and emissions.  
The study group comprises the universe of food manufacturing facilities reporting 
to the Environmental Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory in 2010.  These 
facilities have a three-digit NAICS code of 311.  Facility and parent company level data 
were taken from 2010. This year was significant in that organizations were feeling the 
shift between the lack of regulatory will under the administration of George W. Bush 
(Parenteau 2004; Solomon and Eilperin 2007) and the increased attention to the 
Environmental Protection Agency following the election of Barack Obama. The 
demographic data were taken from both the 2010 Decennial Census and the American 
Community Survey 2008-2012 summary files. All other contextual variable data were 
taken from 2009. I chose the one-year lag to avoid any simultaneity bias (i.e., the 
  
84 
 
independent variables could be construed as either the cause or the effect of the 
dependent variables in question). There are a total 1,093 plants in the research design, 
with social vulnerability scores calculated at one-mile, two-mile, and three-mile radii. 
The completed dataset included 3,279 observations.  
Dependent Variable- Plant Level Emissions 
For this project, I compared findings for two dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable was plant-level air emissions. According to the Toxic Release 
Inventory, the food industry was the fourth highest emitter, with almost 128 million 
pounds of toxic releases. Over 40 million pounds of those releases were fugitive and 
stack air emissions.51 The total air emissions for 2010 for the food industry was a little 
over 3% of total disposal and other releases.  The chemicals most emitted were nitrate 
compounds, n-hexane, ammonia, hydrochloric acid, barium compounds, methanol, 
acetaldehyde, and sulfuric acid. 
 Almost half of the facilities in the dataset reported zero emissions. To account 
for the skew in the variable, I transformed the continuous emissions data into an ordinal 
variable based on the accumulated amount (i.e., pounds) of air emissions. I took the 
2010 emissions of each plant, ranked the plants based on emissions, calculated the 
percentile categories, and assigned each plant to one of the six categories.  I created six 
categories: 1) no emissions made up of all observations with zero emissions; 2) very low 
emissions made up of all observations between 0 and the 1st percentile of emissions; 3) 
                                                 
51 Fugitive air emissions refer to the releases that are not confined and can include spills 
and leaks. Stack emissions refer to confined, targeted, and intentional releases.   
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low emissions made up of all observations over the 1st percentile up to the 25th 
percentile; 4) moderate emissions made up of all observations above the 25th percentile 
up to the 50th percentile; 5) high emissions made up of all observations above the 50th 
percentile up to the 75th percentile; and 6) very high emissions made up of all emissions 
above the 75th percentile.  
The second dependent variable measures emissions risk. Researchers have 
developed several ways of measuring toxicity from emissions (Scott et al. 1997; Bouwes 
and Hassur 1997; Toffel and Marshall 2004). The Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Risk Screening Indicators (RSEI), is a toxicity score that is widely used in academic 
research (Sicotte and Swanson 2007; Grant et al. 2010). Although RSEI has been 
critiqued for not being adequate in estimating non-human environmental impacts, 
scholars have recommended it as the best measure for estimating risk to human health 
(Toffel and Marshall 2004). The RSEI score uses emissions data from the TRI to 
develop a toxicity score based on the actual amount of toxic emissions, a toxicity weight 
of the chemicals involved, and a calculated risk hazard from the emissions (Bouwes and 
Hassur 1997).  Like the emissions data, the toxicity score variable was significantly 
skewed. To account for this skew, I transformed the continuous variable into a 
dichotomous variable with one representing some toxicity and zero representing no 
toxicity.  
Independent Variables Level 1: Measures of Social Vulnerability   
 After years of debate about the most important characteristics associated with 
environmental inequality (e.g., whether race or class is more important), there has been 
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little consensus or resolution regarding this issue. To move the literature forward, I used 
social vulnerability, which combines various characteristics that have been consistently 
dealt with in the environmental justice and vulnerability literatures, to create a more 
comprehensive measure. As described in the previous chapter, social vulnerability scores 
were calculated using an additive procedure that combined several measurements that, 
according to the vulnerability and environmental justice literature indicated the level of 
the social vulnerability of a population.  
Independent Variables: Mediating Influences on Social Vulnerability 
 Part of the gap in the current environmental justice literature is that while there 
are debates as to whether certain demographic populations are affected by environmental 
inequity over others, consensus is limited regarding what causes these vulnerabilities to 
have more or less importance. For example, scholars have argued that environmental 
racism has caused these issues, but there is no consensus on what that means. On the one 
hand, environmental racism can refer to intentional discrimination resulting in “racially 
inequitable environmental outcomes” (Been 1994a; Downey 1998, 769). On the other 
hand, scholars argue that environmental racism is more institutional and refers to any 
actions that lead to the disproportionate environmental impacts on communities based on 
race or color, regardless of intention (Downey 1998; Mohai and Bryant 1992; Bullard 
1996).52 I use this latter position, to argue that in order to understand the 
                                                 
52 Laura Pulido (2000) describes suburbanization as a way that white privilege plays out 
spatially by examining how historically white Americans have been able to move 
outside of the industrial areas of cities, into cleaner areas through this process. This 
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disproportionate environmental risk to socially vulnerable populations we must 
understand the mediating factors that influence these effects.   
 An organizational political economy theory asserts that corporations are 
embedded within different states as well as different levels of the social structure 
(Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016). To this end, a populations’ social 
vulnerability is related to plant-level emissions because of mediating forces at different 
levels of society. This analysis tested the mediating influences of several variables on 
social vulnerability.  Table 8 lists the independent variables identified in the hypotheses 
above, their corresponding measurements, and the source of the data.   
Table 8: Context-level Independent Variables 
 
Hypotheses Concept Measurement Source 
H2/H3 
Non-Profit 
Organizations 
Number of non-profit 
organizations in the state/ 
number of environmental 
organizations in the state  
Center for Charitable 
Statistics 
H4 
Parent 
Company size Total assets  ReferenceUSA/ Compustat 
H5 
Corporate 
Structure 
Facility is independent or 
the subsidiary of a parent 
company 
Lexis Nexis Corporate 
Affiliations/ Toxic Release 
Inventory/ Compustat 
H6 
State Business 
Climate 
Business Tax Climate 
Index The Tax Foundation 
H7 
State 
Environmental 
record State Green Score Forbes 
 
                                                 
structural change is less conscious, but leads to a disproportionate amount of people of 
color living in the most environmentally toxic parts of an area.  
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The Forbes green score uses six weighted categories including the state’s “carbon 
footprint, air quality, water quality, hazardous waste management, policy initiatives, and 
energy consumption (Forbes 2007).”  None of these categories overlap with the other 
variables in the dataset. The Business Tax Climate Index scores all 50 states based on 
taxes that “matter most to business” including the “corporate income, individual income, 
sales, property, and unemployment insurance” taxes (Tax Foundation 2009).  I consulted 
three sources to determine the structure of the facility, (i.e., whether it was independent 
or a subsidiary). The Parent company size was measured based on its total assets.53 
These data were found using Compustat and were cross-referenced using 
ReferenceUSA. The number of community organizations was measured using the 
number of organizations (non-profit) within the state.  
I used three control variables including the calculated distances from the facility, 
the total population within each given buffer, and the number of similar TRI food 
manufacturing plants in the county (Grant et al. 2010).   
Table 9 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in this section and Table 10 is a 
correlation matrix for all the variables listed
                                                 
53 Parent Company size was also measured by total employees, but did not significantly 
change the findings for the analyses.  
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Table 9: Means/Percent and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Analyses 
 
Variables   Mean/Percent Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum  
      
Dependent Variables      
Toxic Emissions 2.77 1.924 1 6 
Hazardous Emissions* 0.45 0.498 0 1 
      
First-Level Variables      
Social Vulnerability (SV) -0.037 8.182 -14.295 25.32 
Total population 32.5 152.125 0 1585.28 
Distance from facility  2 0.816 1 3 
Plant density           36.2 19.04 1 76 
     
Mediating Variables     
Stand-alone facility*  0.22 0.412 0 1 
Environmental climate 4.91 7.22 14.2 43.6 
Business climate  28.73 0.717 3.6 7.42 
Community organizations 46035 43370.85 4760 166716 
Environmental organizations 1603.3 1607.966 134 5895 
Parent size (assets) 6128.25 17744.91 0 195014 
*dummy variable
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Table 10: Correlation Matrix for Variables Used in Multilevel Analyses 
 
Variables
Toxic 
Emissions
Hazardous 
Emissions
Social 
Vulnerability 
Total 
Population 
Distance 
from 
Facility 
Plant 
Density 
Stand 
alone 
facility 
business 
climate
environmental 
climate
community  
organization 
environmental 
organizations
parent 
size 
(assets)
Toxic Emissions 1
Hazardous Emissions 0.781 1
Social Vulnerability -0.076 0.03 1
Total Population -0.0389 0.019 0.483 1
Distance from Facility -0.001 -0.001 0.039 -0.023 1
Plant Density -0.065 -0.083 -0.074 0.047 -0.004 1
Stand alone facility 0.106 0.117 0.04 0.075 -0.002 0.004 1
business climate 0.067 0.063 0.127 -0.027 0.003 -0.433 -0.029 1
environmental climate -0.099 -0.047 0.086 0.102 0.003 0.107 0.042 -0.261 1
community  organization -0.084 -0.086 0.160 0.116 -0.002 0.643 0.008 -0.194 0.188 1
environmental organizations -0.074 -0.069 0.166 0.112 -0.003 0.521 -0.015 -0.192 0.182 0.857 1
parent size (assets) 0.022 0.050 0.126 0.051 -0.001 0.003 -0.163 -0.038 0.028 0.019 0.028 1
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Multilevel Analyses 
  I theorized that social vulnerability is mediated by or “nested” within larger 
community, organizational, and political contexts which makes the use of a multilevel 
model a statistically appropriate method (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; Diprete and 
Forristal 1994). With a multilevel logistic model, I did away with the assumption that all 
the variables are independent from one another. Rather, I assumed that the observations 
at the highest level (regions) are uncorrelated with one another. Furthermore, I needed 
only assume that the level one residual variance is constant. The variables are nested 
within states that are nested within EPA regions. This clustering analysis assumes that 
there is less variance within clusters than between clusters. In this case, the variance 
among facilities is less within states and regions than among them. Thus, use of an 
unclustered model is inappropriate (Kahn and Shaw 2011).  In other words, I assumed 
that communities and organizations in the same states and region are more similar than 
communities and organizations from different states and regions. I utilized STATA 
melogit and meologit commands to run the multilevel models. Melogit models are 
multilevel logit models and meologit are multilevel ordered logit models.  
Equations 
 For each of the dependent variables, there are different regression equations. The 
first level of the multilevel model describes the relationship between plant emissions and 
the population’s social vulnerability score. The regression equation for the dichotomous 
dependent variable is as follows:  
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P =
𝑒𝑎+𝑏1  𝑋1
1+𝑒
𝑎+𝑏1 𝑋1
    where p is the predicted probability of the non-linear function of the x 
variables (emissions ranking and hazardous emission probability).  
The regression equation for the ordinal and categorical dependent variable is as follows:  
 𝑃𝑟 = (𝑘𝑖−1 < 𝑏1𝑋1 + 𝑏2𝑋2 +  𝑏𝑘𝑋𝑘  +  𝑢𝑗  ≤  𝑘𝑖), where Pr is the probability of 
observing a specific category, i, for the x variables. k refers to the cut points for each 
category (see table 9 for variables’ names).  
 The second level of the model incorporates context level variables theorized to 
influence the relationship between social vulnerability and plant emissions. The addition 
of the second level of the model accounts for the ways in which the behavior of the 
facilities are not just random, but are nested within states.  
The regression equation for the second level of the multilevel model for the 
dichotomous dependent variable is as follows: 
 𝑃(𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑢0𝑗) =
exp [𝛾00+ 𝛾01 𝑥1𝑖𝑗+𝑈0𝑗]
1+exp [𝛾00+ 𝛾01 𝑥1𝑖𝑗+𝑈0𝑗]
,  where p is the predicted 
probability of the non-linear function of the x variables, clustered within j states. The 
regression equation for the second level of the multilevel model for the ordinal and 
categorical dependent variable is as follows: Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑗 > 𝑘|𝑥𝑖𝑗,𝑘, 𝑢𝑗   = 𝐻(𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 +  𝑧𝑖𝑗𝑢𝑗 −
𝐾𝑘),  where Pr is the probability of observing a particular category for the x variables by, 
i, which refers to the food manufacturing plants clustered by j states. As in the one level 
model k refers to the cutpoints for each category. In this case, H represents the 
cumulative probability. In this model, there is no constant, because that is accounted for 
in the cutpoints.  
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Although, two-level models capture all the variables and clusters all facilities at 
the state level, this cluster does not account for all the variance. While facilities are 
nested within states, states are nested in EPA regions. For the dichotomous dependent 
variable, the remaining portion of the equation finds the probability of observing the 
occurrence (i.e., risky emissions). For the ordered, categorical dependent variable the 
remaining portion of the equation finds the probability of the particular category (i.e., no 
emissions, very low emissions, etc.). This is based on the outcome of the x variables (i.e. 
social vulnerability score etc.) for i facilities, clustered within j states, and within M 
regions.  
Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter outlined the hypotheses and research design for this dissertation. In 
the following chapter, I describe the results from the two sets of analysis, and discuss 
how these results relate to social vulnerability and context variable hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
 In this chapter, I outline the results and findings from the two sets of multilevel 
analysis.  As discussed in detail in the previous chapter, I conducted two multilevel 
analyses to test my hypotheses associated with the relationship between social 
vulnerability scores and toxic emissions. In the next two sections of this chapter, I report 
on the preliminary results for both the logistic multilevel regression and the multilevel 
ordered logistic regression54.    
Both sets of results include three tests of model fit. The Likelihood Ratio Chi-
Squared Statistic tests the null hypothesis that all the x variables are zero. If it is 
significant, then we can reject the null hypothesis and conclude that information about 
the x variables allows us to make better predictions than we would without them. The 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) are 
similar tests of overall model fit. The smaller the number on both the BIC and AIC, the 
better the overall fit of the model. 
Multilevel Ordered Logistic Regression 
In this section, I discuss the results from the models using the dependent variable 
of total emissions percentile. The first model shows the results from the one level 
ordered logistic regression measuring the relationship between the social vulnerability 
                                                 
54 I also ran both full regressions as unclustered models that assume independence of all 
the variables within the model. Overall, the findings remained the same, with a couple of 
exceptions that I will discuss. 
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scores and the emissions rankings. The two control variables included the distance from 
the facility and the total population of the area. The second model introduces the 
multilevel analysis, which included all the hypothesized independent variables (n=10). 
The third model included all the interaction variables stated in the hypotheses in the 
previous chapter. This final model included measuring how the majority of the 
independent variables affect the relationship between the social vulnerability score and 
the total emissions percentile.   
Table 11 shows the results from the three models as well as the results from the 
three tests of model fit. It shows that the nested model, which included the interaction 
variables (Model 3), has the best fit.
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Table 11: Effects of Independent Variables on Total Emissions Ranking 
_ Model 1 _________ _____ Model 2 ____ __ Model 3 _______ ________
Coef. odds ratio S.E.
a
Coef. odds ratio S.E. Coef. odds ratio S.E.
Main Effects 
Social Vulnerability (SV) -.0133* -1.3 0.006 -0.026*** 0.975 0.007 0.008^ 1.008 0.047
Total population -0.002 0 0.003 -0.0000934 0.9999066 0.0003536 -0.0002 0.9999066 0.0003536
Distance from facility 0.004 0.4 0.041 0.004 1.004335 0.0418 -0.00003 1 0.042
Plant density -0.010* 0.9903823 0.0048147 -0.011* 0.989 0.0049
Stand alone facility 0.560*** 1.75065 0.1438897 0.554*** 1.7401 0.1433
Business climate -0.004 0.996 0.007 0.052 1.053 0.124
Environmental climate -0.031** 0.97 0.011 -0.034** 0.966 0.011
Community organizations 0.00000112 1.000001 0.0000035 0.00000163 1 0.00000353
Environmental organizations 0.0000505 1.0001 0.0001 0.00004 1 0.00008
Parent size (assets) 0.00001** 1.00001 0.00000186 0.00000318 1.000003 0.00000218
Interaction Effects
SV x plant density -0.0024 0.9976 0.004
SV x stand alone facility 0.193^ 1.2127 0.122
SV x business climate -0.003 0.9971 0.0651
SV x environmental climate -0.013* 0.9867 0.007
SV x community organizations -0.00000157 0.99999 0.00000231
SV x environmental organizations 0.0000756 1.0001 0.0001
SV x parent size (assets) 0.000005* 1 0.00000242
Group Variables
Region 10 10
State 49 49
AIC 8840.21 8689.198 4095.899
BIC 8888.52 8791.858 4210.636
LR test: chi-square 16.08 77.18 75.8
Prob > chi-square 0.0011 0 0
p<.10^ p < .05 *  p<.01**  p<.001***
a 
Standard Error (S.E.)
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Results  
In the first and second models, the lower the social vulnerability score, or the less 
vulnerable, the higher the total emissions ranking. A higher ranking equals more total 
emissions. In this model, the relationship was statistically significant.55 With all the 
independent variables included in the second model, the relationship between the social 
vulnerability score and the total emissions ranking became stronger and more 
significant.  In the final model, the direct relationship between the social vulnerability 
score and the total emissions ranking switched direction and maintained significance at 
the p > .10 level.   
In models two and three, the number of food manufacturing plants located in the 
county, had a significant effect on the level of emissions. The more facilities in the area, 
the lower the emissions from any one facility. However, in the third model, the number 
of plants in the area did not have a significant effect on the relationship between the 
social vulnerability score and the total emissions ranking.  
In both models, whether or not the facility was independent or a subsidiary of a 
parent company, had a significant effect on the total emissions ranking. Facilities that 
were independent had higher total emissions rankings than facilities that were a 
subsidiary of a parent company. Furthermore, whether or not the facility was an 
independent plant had a significant effect on the relationship between the social 
                                                 
55 I also ran a bivariate ordered logistic regression that included the social vulnerability 
score and the total emissions percentile. The negative relationship between the two 
variables was also significant in this model.  
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vulnerability score and the total emissions ranking.  Specifically, the relationship 
between social vulnerability scores and the total emissions ranking was stronger for 
independent facilities than for facilities that are subsidiaries of a parent company.  
In the second model, the size of the parent company had a significant effect on 
the total emissions ranking: the larger the parent company, in total assets, the higher the 
emissions ranking for the facility. In model three, the size of the parent company was not 
significant. However, the interaction between parent company size and social 
vulnerability was significant. This finding tells us that the larger the parent company, the 
stronger the relationship between social vulnerability and the total emissions ranking.  
The overall climate of the state had mixed effects on the relationship between 
social vulnerability and the toxic emissions ranking. The state’s tax climate had no 
significant effect on the total emissions in either in the second model or the third 
model.56 However, the state’s environmental climate did have a significant effect on the 
total emissions ranking. The higher a state’s environmental score, the lower the 
emissions from the facility. Additionally, in the third model, a state’s environmental 
score also had a significant effect on the relationship between social vulnerability and 
total emissions ranking. In other words, the higher the state’s environmental score (i.e., 
the stronger the state’s environmental reputation) produced a weaker relationship 
between the social vulnerability score and the total emissions ranking.  
                                                 
56 When the model was run with variables unclustered, the state tax climate had a 
significant effect on the total emissions rankings. The more business friendly, a state’s 
tax climate, the higher the levels of emissions from each facility.   
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For all three models, the total population and the distance from the facility had no 
significant effect on the total emissions ranking. In addition, for the two models in which 
they are included, the number of community organizations and the number of 
environmental organizations57 in the state, had no significant effect on the total 
emissions ranking. Additionally, the number of community organizations and 
environmental organizations had no significant effect on the relationship between social 
vulnerability and the total emissions ranking.  
In the following section, I review the findings from the second set of multilevel 
models.  
Multilevel Logistic Regression 
In this section, I discuss the results from the models using the dependent variable 
of whether or not a facility has hazardous emissions. The first model reports results from 
the one level logistic regression measuring the relationship between the social 
vulnerability scores and whether or not a facility has hazardous emissions. The two 
control variables included the distance from the facility and the total population of the 
area. The second model introduces the multilevel analysis, which included all the  
  
                                                 
57 The final model was run with both community organizations and environmental 
organizations in the analysis. In alternative models, they were run individually. This did 
not influence the significance or the relationship.  
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independent variables hypothesized about. The third model included all the interaction 
variables outlined in the hypotheses in the previous chapter. This includes measuring 
how the majority of the independent variables affected the relationship between the 
social vulnerability score and the probability of having hazardous emissions.  
 Table 8 shows the results from the three models as well as the results from the 
three tests of model fit. It shows that both nested models (model 2 and 3) are similar in 
fit. 
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Table 12: Effects of Independent Variables on Whether a Facility Has Hazardous Emissions 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coef. odds ratio S.E.
a
Coef. odds ratio S.E. Coef. odds ratio S.E.
Main Effects 
Social Vulnerability (SV) 0.004 1.004 0.006 -0.002 0.998 0.008 0.090^ 1.094 0.059
Total population 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.0005 1.00 0.04
Distance from facility -0.008 1.00 0.044 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.0007 1.00 0.05
Plant density -0.015* 0.99 0.01 -0.017** 0.98 0.01
Stand alone facility 0.703*** 2.02 0.19 0.696*** 2.01 0.19
Business climate -0.01 0.990 0.009 0.124 1.132 0.180
Environmental climate -0.026* 0.975 0.014 -0.030* 0.970 0.015
Community organizations 0.00000 1 0.000005 0.000001 1 0.000005
Environmental organizations 0.0001 1.0001 0.0001 0.0001 1.0001 0.0001
Parent size (assets) 0.00001*** 1.00001 0.000002 0.00001* 1 0.000003
Interaction Effects
SV x plant density 0.000 1.0003 0.004
SV x stand alone facility -0.07 0.93 0.12
SV x business climate -0.094 0.91 0.076
SV x environmental climate -0.017* 0.984 0.008
SV x community organizations 0.000 1.000 0.000
SV x environmental organizations 0.000 1.000 0.000
SV x parent size (assets) 0.000007* 1.0 0.0
Group Variables
Region 10 10
State 49 49
AIC 4271.447 4093.975 4097.004
BIC 4295.602 4172.48 4217.78
LR test: chi-square 3.4 99.33 102.83
Prob > chi-square 0.3343 0.00 0.00
p<.10^ p < .05 *  p<.01**  p<.001***
a 
Standard Error (S.E.)
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Discussion 
In the first model, the social vulnerability score had a statistically significant 
relationship with the hazard dummy.58 With all the independent variables included in the 
second model, the relationship between the social vulnerability score and the probability 
of hazardous emissions switched direction, but was not significant. In the final model, 
the direct relationship between the social vulnerability score and the probability of 
hazardous emissions switched direction again in line with model 1 and regained 
significance. Overall, the higher the social vulnerability score, or the more vulnerable, 
the higher the odds that a facility would have hazardous emissions.   
In models two and three, the number of food manufacturing plants located in the 
county, had a significant effect on the probability of hazardous emissions. That is to say, 
the more facilities in the area, the lower the probability that there would be hazardous 
emissions from any one facility. Moreover, in the third model, the number of plants in 
the area also had a significant effect on the relationship between the social vulnerability 
score and the probability of hazardous emissions. 
In both models, whether or not the facility was independent or a subsidiary of a 
parent company, had a significant effect on the probability of hazardous emissions. 
Independent facilities were more likely to have hazardous emissions than facilities that 
were a subsidiary of a parent company. However, whether or not the facility was 
                                                 
58 I also ran a bivariate logistic regression that included the social vulnerability score and 
the hazard variable. The relationship between the two variables was also significant in 
this model.  
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independent had no significant effect on the relationship between the social vulnerability 
score and the probability of hazardous emissions.  
In both model 2 and model 3, the size of the parent company had a significant 
effect on the probability of hazardous emissions. The larger the parent company, in total 
assets, the higher the probability that the facility had hazardous emissions. Furthermore, 
the interaction between parent company size and social vulnerability was also significant 
and positive, telling us that the larger the parent company, the stronger the relationship 
between social vulnerability and the probability of hazardous emissions.  
The overall climate of the state had mixed effects on the relationship between 
social vulnerability and the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions. The state’s tax 
climate had no significant effect on the probability of hazardous emissions in either the 
second model or the third model. However, the state’s environmental climate had a 
significant effect on the probability of hazardous emissions. The higher a state’s 
environmental score, the lower the probability that a facility had hazardous emissions. 
Additionally, in the third model, a state’s environmental score also had a significant 
effect on the relationship between social vulnerability and the probability of hazardous 
emissions.  High state environmental scores had weaker relationships between the social 
vulnerability scores and the probability of the facility having hazardous emissions.  
For all three models, the total population and the distance from the facility had no 
significant effect on the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions. For the two 
models in which they were included, the number of community organizations and the 
number of environmental organizations in the state, had no significant effect on 
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hazardous emissions variable.59 Additionally, the number of community organizations 
and environmental organizations60 had no significant effect on the relationship between 
social vulnerability and the probability that a facility had hazardous emissions.  
Findings: Reviewing Hypotheses  
 The two previous sections within this chapter detailed the results for each of the 
independent variables. In this section, I synthesize these results to determine which of 
the seven hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5, were supported.  
H1) The higher a community’s social vulnerability score, the higher the odds of a plant 
having risky emissions. 
In the full model (Model 3) for the ordered logistic regression, the relationship 
between the social vulnerability score and the total emissions ranking was significant 
and positive. With every increase in the social vulnerability score, the odds of a facility 
having higher emissions increases by .8%, holding all other variables constant. 
Furthermore, in the full model (Model 3) for the logistic model, the relationship between 
the social vulnerability and the odds of a facility having higher emissions was significant 
and positive. For every increase in the social vulnerability score, other variables being 
equal, the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions increases by 9.37%.   
                                                 
59 When the model was run with variables unclustered, a higher number of community 
organizations within the state, increased the odds of a facility having hazardous 
emissions. This relationship was significant.  
60  The final model was run with both community organizations and environmental 
organizations in the analysis. In alternative models, they were run individually. This did 
not influence the statistical significance or the magnitude and direction of the 
relationship. 
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These two sets of findings suggest that the first hypothesis was supported. The 
fact that the direction of the relationship switched in both final models, indicated that 
focusing on social vulnerability without additional context can lead to misleading 
results.  
H2) More community organizations strengthen the relationship between plant-level risky 
emissions and social vulnerability.61 
According to the full model (model 3) for the total emissions ranking variable, 
there was no change in the odds of a facility having higher emissions with changes in the 
amounts of community organizations, holding all other variables constant. Moreover, 
other things equal, there was no change in the relationship between social vulnerability 
and the odds of a facility having higher total emissions with changes in the amount of 
community organizations, holding all other variables constant. Additionally, according 
to the full model (Model 3) for the hazard dependent variable, other variables being 
equal, there was no change in the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions with 
changes in the amounts of community organizations. Moreover, other variables being 
equal, there was no change in the relationship between social vulnerability and the odds 
of a facility having hazardous emissions with changes in the amount of community 
organizations.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was not supported. 
                                                 
61 Since I did not hypothesize a direction for this hypothesis, I used a two-tailed test. 
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H3) More environmental organizations weaken the relationship between plant-level 
risky emissions and social vulnerability.  
According to the full model (model 3) for the total emissions ranking variable, 
there was no change in the odds of a facility having higher emissions with changes in the 
amounts of environmental organizations, holding all other variables constant. Moreover, 
other variables being equal, there was no change in the relationship between social 
vulnerability and the odds of a facility having higher total emissions with changes in the 
amount of environmental organizations, holding all other variables constant. 
Additionally, according to the full model (Model 3) for the hazard dependent variable, 
other variables being equal, there was no change in the odds of a facility having 
hazardous emissions with changes in the amounts of environmental organizations.  
Moreover, other variables being equal, there was no change in the relationship between 
social vulnerability and the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions with changes 
in the amount of environmental organizations.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was not supported. 
H4) The larger the parent company, the stronger the relationship between plant-level 
risky emissions and social vulnerability.  
According to the full model (Model 3) for the total emissions ranking variable, 
for every increase in the size of the parent company, the odds of a facility having higher 
emissions increased by .0003%, holding all other variables constant.  Furthermore, for 
every increase in the size of the parent company, the odds of a population’s social 
vulnerability impacting the odds of a facility having higher emissions increased by 
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.0005%, holding all other variables constant. Likewise, according to the full model 
(Model 3) for the hazard dependent variable, other variables being equal, for every 
increase in the size of the parent company, the odds of a facility having hazardous 
emissions increased by .0006%.  Furthermore, other variables being equal, for every 
increase in the size of the parent company, the odds of a population’s social vulnerability 
impacting whether a facility has hazardous emissions increased by .0007%. This is a 
small but significant effect and can mean the difference between negligible amounts of 
toxic emissions and considerable amounts of toxic emissions.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was supported. 
H5) Independent facilities will have a stronger impact on the relationship between plant-
level risky emissions and social vulnerability than facilities with a parent company.  
In model 3 for the total emissions ranking variable, facilities that are independent 
are 74% more likely to have higher emissions than facilities that are subsidiaries, 
holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, the odds of a population’s social 
vulnerability impacting the odds of a facility having higher emissions is 21% more likely 
than if a facility is a subsidiary, holding all other variables constant. Additionally, in 
model 3 for the hazard dependent variable, other variables being equal, facilities that are 
independent are 101% more likely to have hazardous emissions than facilities that are 
subsidiaries. Moreover, other variables being equal, the odds of a population’s social 
vulnerability impacting whether a facility has hazardous emissions is 7% more likely if a 
facility is independent than if a facility is a subsidiary of a parent company.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was supported. 
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H6) The relationship between plant-level risky emissions and social vulnerability is 
weaker in states with stronger business climates.  
In model 3 for the total emissions ranking variable, for every increase in the 
strength of a state’s business climate, the odds of having higher emissions increases by 
5.34%, holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, for every increase in the 
strength of a state’s business climate, the odds of a population’ social vulnerability 
impacting the odds of having higher emissions decreases by .3%, holding all other 
variables constant. Additionally, in model 3 for the hazard dependent variable, other 
variables being equal, for every increase in the strength of a state’s business climate, the 
odds of a facility having hazardous emissions increases by 13%.  Moreover, other 
variables being equal, for every increase in the strength of a state’s business climate, the 
odds of a population’s social vulnerability impacting whether a facility has hazardous 
emissions decreases by 9%.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was supported, although 
the findings were not significant.  
H7) The relationship between plant-level risky emissions and social vulnerability is 
stronger in states with stronger environmental records  
In model 3 for the total emissions ranking variable, for every increase in the 
strength of a state’s environmental record, the odds of having lower emissions increased 
by 3.37%, holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, for every increase in 
strength of a state’s environmental record, the odds of a population’s social vulnerability 
impacting the odds of having lower emissions decreased by 1.3%, holding all other 
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variables constant. Additionally, in the full model (Model 3) for the hazard dependent 
variable, other variables being equal, for every increase in the strength of a state’s 
environmental record, the odds of a facility having hazardous emissions decreased by 
3%.  Moreover, other variables being equal, for every increase in the strength of a state’s 
environmental record, the odds of a population’s social vulnerability impacting whether 
a facility has hazardous emissions decreased by 1.64%.  
These two sets of findings indicated that this hypothesis was supported. 
Plant Density: An Additional Finding  
In the analysis, plant density (i.e. number of plants in the county) was used as a 
control variable. The relationship between plant density and emissions was not 
hypothesized. However, in the full model (model 3) for both the total emissions ranking 
variable and the hazard dependent variable, plant density was a significant factor in 
predicting the odds of emissions.  
 In model 3 for the total emissions ranking variable, for every increase in the 
number of plants within the county, the odds of a facility having lower emissions 
increased by 1.07%, holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, for every increase 
in the number of plants within the county, the odds of a population’s social vulnerability 
impacting the odds of having lower decreased by .2%, holding all other variables 
constant. Additionally, in model 3 for the hazard dependent variable, other things being 
equal, for every increase in the number of plants within the county, the odds of a facility 
having hazardous emissions decreased by 2%. Moreover, other variables being equal, for 
every increase in the number of plants within the county, the odds of a population’s 
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social vulnerability impacting whether a facility has hazardous emissions increased by 
.03%.  
Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter presented the results and findings associated with the relationship 
between social vulnerability and toxic emissions using two different dependent 
variables. The findings from these analyses, showed that five of the seven hypotheses 
were supported to varying degrees, while two of the hypotheses were not supported 
using any of these models. Additionally, the models showed that plant density was a 
significant factor in facility emissions.   
 The next chapter will include a substantive discussion of the findings outlined in 
this chapter as well as implications of these outcomes for further research and social 
action.  
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 In the previous chapter, I presented the findings from the multilevel analyses. 
The first part of this chapter, focuses on ways to interpret the findings using an 
organizational political economy of the environment framework. Overall, these findings 
indicated how important it is to model context and how modeling intersecting 
vulnerabilities provide a simplified, yet more comprehensive picture of the relationships 
between people and organizations.  Said in another way, multiple factors on multiple 
levels of the political-economic structure impacts not just the behavior of organizations, 
but how organizational behavior is related to the communities where they are located.  
Community Discussions 
Social Vulnerability is a complex concept. The straightforward hypothesis that 
socially vulnerable populations are more likely to experience increased hazards becomes 
more complicated once the concept and the resulting measurements are unpacked.  
Developing a new way to measure social vulnerability so that it captures a broad, but 
still related spectrum of vulnerable characteristics that impacts or are impacted by these 
hazards is a tricky undertaking. The components chosen in these analyses were 
determined theoretically to be important indicators in both environmental justice and 
hazards literature.  However, this was the first time that these concepts were combined to 
measure their relationship with toxic emissions from food manufacturing facilities. 
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 In the initial analyses, findings seemed to indicate that higher social 
vulnerability meant less emissions and a reduced likelihood that a facility would have 
hazardous emissions.  However, once the context variables were controlled for, the 
relationship was clearly and significantly positive. Here is one instance in which the 
nested model, provided a stronger analysis. The facilities in the analysis were located 
across the United States. Earlier research has shown that social vulnerability shifts 
depending on where you live in the United States (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 2003; 
Mohai and Saha 2015).  In other words, variance between regions or states is stronger 
than variance within regions or states.  The original models assumed the same variance 
between all facilities and communities regardless of where they were located, while the 
nested models accounted for ways in which the data was clustered. This provided a more 
accurate view of how social vulnerability plays out in the analysis, and in this case had 
the effect of switching the direction (from negative to positive) of the relationship 
between social vulnerability and toxic emissions. While this was methodologically 
interestingly, more importantly, it was theoretically interesting in that it was a notable 
example of how variations in the political economy throughout the United States leads to 
variations in how socially vulnerable populations are affected by organizational 
behavior.  
While the changes in the social vulnerability variable exposed differences across 
different parts of the country, the non-importance of the distance variable proved 
interesting in the very local context. These analyses utilized distances of 1, 2, and 3 
miles based on previous research that found differences in these distances to be 
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significant (Mohai and Saha 2007). The distances may have been too close to the facility 
so that the variations were minimal. Since health risks, not accounting for other factors 
such as wind direction, are reduced the farther away from the hazard a population is 
located, the use of comparing social vulnerability of populations closer and farther away 
from a facility may have increased the significance of this variable. Additionally, 
previous research did not look specifically at food manufacturing facilities. The kinds of 
air emissions from different manufacturing plants may travel more or less than one 
another. It may be that at these smaller distances the differences are less important for 
food manufacturing facilities.   
An additional variable at the community level that turned out to be significant 
was the number of similar plants located in the area. Grant et al. (2010), found that the 
amount of manufacturing plants in area was correlated with higher emissions. This 
research, considering the kind of manufacturing facility (i.e., food manufacturing), as 
well as using a nested model, found the opposite. Plant density, or the number of food 
manufacturing facilities within the given county, mattered in several different ways. 
First, more facilities in the area meant less emissions from individual facilities. This is 
not surprising for several reasons.  Increased facilities in the area means increased 
competition for workers as well as increased competition for local community support.  
On the one hand, incentives to site within a community may be oriented towards a 
certain industry. For example, in the rural parts of Minnesota, communities have actively 
engaged in economic development through increasing the presence of the food 
manufacturing industry (Fennelly and Leitner 2002).   
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However, population ecology scholars have argued that density (i.e. the number of 
organizations within the same area) is an important variable to understand organizational 
birth, death, and most importantly legitimation (Hannan et al. 1995). The closer in 
proximity to other organizations, the less dependence the local community has on any 
one of those plants. If one plant closes, there are others to take its place. Additionally, 
higher plant density may make plant emissions easier to monitor and so may reduce the 
propensity for plants to produce high amounts of toxic air emissions in the area.  
In addition to its direct effect, the findings from the plant density variable also 
suggested that when there are more facilities in a given area, the relationship between 
social vulnerability and toxic emissions was stronger (i.e., facilities that were located in 
areas more densely populated with other facilities were more likely to have higher 
emissions if the population’s social vulnerability score was higher). In other words, 
social vulnerability matters more in these areas.  In his environmental justice framework, 
Pellow (2004), theorized that environmental inequality not only included the relationship 
between hazards and certain groups of people, but it was also a complex interplay of 
relationships within local communities that reinforce power dynamics.  For the most 
part, by 2010, workers in food manufacturing facilities tended to be largely low- income 
and minority, primarily Hispanic, and immigrants (Lo and Jacobsen 2011). Additionally, 
we know that the food manufacturing industry has largely brought these workers in from 
different places to work in their plants (Fennelly and Leitner 2002). This would mean a 
higher population of vulnerable groups of people (specifically vulnerable populations 
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that depend directly on these facilities) when more food manufacturing facilities are 
located in the same area.  
Findings from these analyses show us that community level variables have an 
important effect on emissions. However, unlike other research on environmental justice, 
this dissertation takes this analysis a step further. Communities do not exist in vacuums 
and facilities do not operate outside of their larger organizational context. In the next 
section, I focus my discussion on how organizational characteristics impact the 
relationship between the social vulnerability of local communities and the toxic 
emissions from food manufacturing plants.   
Organizational Discussions 
Grant, Jones, and Trautner (2004), found that plants run by absentee parent 
companies were not any more likely than plants that were not, to have higher log 
emissions. As in the case of plant density, this project also produced a different finding. 
Independent facilities, or facilities that were not subsidiaries or branches of a larger 
parent company were more likely to have higher and hazardous emissions. This makes 
sense for two reasons. Facilities that are owned by parent companies have increased 
visibility, in fact, around 30% of the facilities in this dataset were owned by companies 
in the Forbes 500 in 2010. This increased visibility could increase the way organizations 
are accountable to the public around emissions (Prechel and Istvan 2016) and could lead 
to lower emissions by the organizations where they are located. 
Additionally, we can also assume that independent facilities have less resources 
with which to develop pollution abatement strategies. Furthermore, in more highly 
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vulnerable communities, there is no specific incentive to control air emissions. This is 
supported by the second finding around the facility structure, that the relationship 
between the social vulnerability of a local population and a facility’s emissions is 
stronger when a facility is independent. The independent structure means localized 
decision-making would be more responsive to the social power of the local community. 
Moreover, in cases where these local communities provide incentive packages for 
organizations to locate their facilities in specific areas (Leistritz and Sell 2001; 
Broadway 2000; Fennelly and Leitner 2002), facilities would have less reason to clean 
up their emissions in areas where the residents have limited political power.  This can be 
exacerbated in communities that are most dependent on a particular industry. One 
addition for future analysis could be the percentage of a community’s population 
employed by the food industry.  
For organizations that have a parent company, I explored further the role of 
parent company size. For the most part, research has found that parent company size is 
negatively correlated with emissions, namely that larger parent companies have lower 
emissions rates (Ambec and Lanoie 2008; Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 
2016). This dissertation, confirms these findings from the perspective of the individual 
facility: the larger the parent company, the lower the likelihood of more and hazardous 
emissions. Additionally, larger parent companies have higher odds that a populations’ 
social vulnerability will be positively correlated with the odds of more and hazardous 
emissions.   
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For decades, population ecology scholars argued that organizational size and age 
is strongly correlated to structural inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977; 1984). In other 
words, larger organizations are less likely to make significant changes. Furthermore, this 
would mean, especially if a facility is older, larger organizations would be less likely to 
make updates and upgrades to decrease the level of emissions, even if newer 
organizations are more environmentally friendly. However, this argument does not hold 
up in the continued findings on parent company size. Prechel and Morris (2010) argued 
that organizations find opportunities to act in certain ways based on the context in which 
they operate. In this case, larger state and regional context matters to organizational 
decision making and specifically in this case, their proximity to socially vulnerable 
populations also make a difference. In the absence of external incentives or 
consequences for an organization to reduce emissions, Prechel and Istvan (2016) found 
that penalties are not large enough for organizations to change their behaviors to avoid 
them. In short, decision making is influenced by opportunities. To put this in a different 
way, if location provides opportunities to focus less on maintaining environmental 
controls, namely areas where socially vulnerable populations are located, then larger 
organizations, that have more resources to control their production practices, would be 
less likely to commit to maintaining those environmental controls. This would be the 
case even as overall larger parent companies are correlated with fewer emissions.  
Additionally, while larger parent companies tend to be more visible, larger companies 
tend to mean more complicated organizational structures that would be more difficult to 
manage (Prechel and Istvan 2016). We can assume then, that with larger companies, a 
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local facility may have much more localized control and would make decisions based on 
the communities in which they are located.  
Organizational characteristics of the parent company provides an internal context 
under which facilities operate. This section suggests that the relationship between a 
facility and its community is contingent on its organizational structure and its size. These 
components affect internal decision-making as well as its interaction with the outside 
world. The next section focuses specifically on the role of the larger social, political, and 
economic context in which facilities and communities operate. 
State and Region-wide Discussions 
In recent years, there has been some research on the role of civil society, 
specifically nongovernmental organizations in reducing emissions. Specifically, 
researchers have noted that the existence of churches and non-profits means lower 
emissions rates (Grant, Jones, and Trautner 2004; Touche 2012; Grant and Vasi 2016).  
Although state agencies provide monitoring and enforcement, non-profit organizations 
can serve to bring mainstream awareness to a particular issue or serve as “watch dogs” 
for bad behavior. This project, however, found that more non-profit organizations and 
specifically more environmental organizations, were not correlated with lower 
emissions. In fact, I found that the relationship was very small and insignificant. There 
are both methodological and theoretical reasons for why this may have been the case.  
From a methodological perspective, while I was measuring relationships between 
local communities and the facilities in the area, I measured the number of organizations 
within the state, which may have simply been too far removed to affect this relationship. 
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I might have found a different effect if I had looked at organizations within close 
proximity to the facility. Additionally, a second methodological issue is that the number 
of environmental organizations statewide may be considered with the state’s overall 
environmental score and the measure itself could be redundant.  
 There are also theoretical reasons for finding a lack of relationship between the 
number of non-profit organizations, a community’s social vulnerability, and a facility’s 
toxic emissions. First, non-profit organizations, specifically environmental organization 
have a long history of, at best, not prioritizing and, at worst, ignoring issues of 
environmental justice62 (Bullard 2008). This would mean that the mere existence of 
environmental organizations would not necessarily be correlated with any change in 
localized emissions of a facility or their relationship with their local vulnerable 
communities. Additionally, even if non-profit organizations are local, their goals may be 
directed at protection of open spaces or selected neighborhoods (Freudenberg and 
Steinsapir 1991; Dunlap and Mertig 2014). To illustrate in the city of Austin, a self-
proclaimed green city, environmental organizations, such as Save Our Springs Alliance 
and others, have been instrumental in passing environmental protections, many of which 
apply only to the historically white, West Side of Austin.  Meanwhile, zoning on the 
East Side, populated primarily by people of color and low-income residents, allowed for 
heavy polluting industries to be sited in residential neighborhoods. While grassroots 
                                                 
62 See historical chapter of this dissertation.  
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environmental activists advocated for these vulnerable areas of Austin, they were less 
likely to have non-profit status or to be well resourced.  
A second reason for the lack of relationship between non-profit organizations and 
toxic emissions can be found in the literature on the resource dependence of non-profits. 
Research from several disciplines suggest that the more organizations are dependent on 
corporations for funding support, the less likely they would be to actively and publicly 
go against them (Froelich 1999; Austin 2000; Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 
2004). This dependence is additionally why communities would be more likely to 
support corporations regardless of their behavior (Lichtenstein, Drumwright, and Braig 
2004). This situation is further exacerbated if the non-profit board is composed of 
business executives (Guo and Acar 2005). Further research is needed to examine how 
this relationship changes as non-profits diversify their funding and reduces their 
dependency on specific corporations would further this analysis.  
 While environmental organizations do not predict levels of emissions, a state’s 
environmental record does. The findings from this dissertation is in line with earlier 
research (Prechel and Touche 2014; Prechel and Istvan 2016) and suggests that a state’s 
commitment to environmental policies and actions has a direct impact on a facility’s 
emissions. Furthermore, there is a weaker relationship between the social vulnerability 
of a local population and the emissions of a facility in states with stronger environmental 
records. This is a particularly important finding because it shows that a state’s 
commitment to the environment, not only has a positive impact on environmental 
changes such as parks and open spaces, but also has a positive impact on protecting the 
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most vulnerable from environmental ills such as toxic emissions.  Furthermore, it 
illustrates that if a state has blanket environmental protections for the population, 
controlling for enforcement, organizations will have fewer opportunities to behave less 
environmentally friendly (Soule 2009; King and Pearce 2010).  Although, there is less 
risk for an organization located in a vulnerable community to be penalized for poor 
environmental behavior (Zimmerman 1993), I would assert that in more environmentally 
friendly states this risk is still higher than in states that do not prioritize environmental 
issues when attempting to attract business investment.  
The relationship between the emissions and the business climate is exactly as 
expected, namely that a stronger business tax climate increases the odds of a facility’s 
higher and hazardous emissions. Although, this relationship was not significant, it does 
tell an important story. First, as one would expect, a state’s business tax climate is 
negatively correlated with a state’s environmental record. This would mean that those 
states that have tax systems which specifically benefit business would be less 
environmentally friendly and facilities would have less reason to pay attention to their 
environmental behavior. Additionally, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, to attract 
industry into certain areas, communities are more likely to limit environmental and tax 
regulations ((Leistritz and Sell 2001; Broadway 2000; Fennelly and Leitner 2002). These 
local communities would only be able to do this, if there is room within their state 
regulations to do so.  
This section focused the discussion on how toxic emissions are affected by 
different levels of society. The organizational political economy of the environment 
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framework (Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016) allows us to look at how 
these different levels have a direct impact on organizational behavior. But more 
importantly, it allows us to look at how they interact, and how variations in political-
legal arrangements changes those outcomes. In the case of this dissertation, variations in 
community level, organizational level, and state/regional level characteristics impact 
how facilities relate to the socially vulnerable populations that are in proximity to them. 
The last section of this chapter serves to tie the dissertation together and discuss 
implications of this research.  
Conclusions 
 This dissertation explored the relationship between social vulnerability and 2010 
emissions from food manufacturing facilities and focused on political-economic factors 
that could have had an impact on that relationship. Considering the findings in the 
previous chapter and the discussion above, there are two significant takeaways from this 
study.  
In response to the first research question, “Are socially vulnerable populations at 
a disproportionate risk for being affected by emissions from food manufacturing 
industries?” 
 Social Vulnerability is one way of analyzing how population characteristics 
are related to toxic emissions. Overall, this research suggests that populations 
with higher levels of social vulnerability are more at risk for being affected 
by emissions from food manufacturing facilities.  
  
123 
 
In response to the second research question, How do organizational and political-
economic factors affect the relationship between a community’s social vulnerability and 
the toxic emissions of local plants?” 
 Context matters. The organizational political economy of the environment has a 
direct impact not only on organizational behavior (i.e., amounts of emissions), 
but how organizational behavior relates to additional factors (e.g., social 
vulnerability, facility density, and environmental regulatory climate).  
Social Vulnerability  
 In the environmental justice literature, there have been years of debates 
surrounding what matters more, race or class. Dozens of studies over several decades 
have engaged in this debate (Bullard 1983; Gould 1986; Gelobter 1992; Mohai and 
Bryant 1992; Anderton, Anderson, Oakes, and Fraser 1994; Brown 1995; Hamilton 
1995; Ringquist 1997; Tiefenbacher 1998; Hird and Reese 1998; Downey 1998; 
Stretesky and Lynch 2002; Smith 2007; Mohai, Pellow, and Roberts 2009). This 
dissertation sought to step outside of that ongoing debate to recognize that not only are 
race and class intricately connected, but they are also connected to several other factors 
that make some individuals and communities more vulnerable than others. The ongoing 
oppression olympics of who has it worse than whom is an unproductive argument. 
Historical analyses note that paying close attention to who is the most vulnerable, shifts 
attention away from the oppressor, who is doing the harm and what structures and 
systems allow them to keep doing so and ignores the fact that large segments of whites, 
Native Americans and other populations are exposed to industrial toxic emissions (i.e, 
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toxic pollution has become a social justice issue). As Perrow (1997: 66) argued, we need 
to shift the focus to “the most intensive and effective environmental destroyers…that 
externalize their pollution costs to society.”  
To this end, I focused on addressing the vulnerability debate through finding 
interconnections. A social vulnerability score is not just a mathematical approach for 
putting similar components together, it is a political overture for saying that toxic 
industrial waste is a threat to everyone. From an economic perspective, there are 
significant data to support that racial minorities, the poor, and working class are the most 
vulnerable to environmental ills. Moreover, their communities are seen as strategic 
opportunities for bad organizational behavior and toxic emissions that impact everyone 
(e.g., adverse health outcomes that affect some parts of the population may have the 
potential to increase the overall health care costs for society as a whole).  Findings from 
this dissertation illustrate the ways in which this plays out, in this case with higher and 
more hazardous emissions.  
 While the use of social vulnerability scores proved to be a helpful way of 
performing an environmental justice analysis, it was not without its limitations. First, 
while the components chosen to be a part of the score were theoretically driven 
additional components that would have also been supported by theory were not included 
because of data unavailability.  This means that the social vulnerability score is not an 
all-inclusive score that covers all possible vulnerabilities of a population. Secondly, 
theory and past research findings are not always consistent regarding which direction 
vulnerability is related to other factors. For example, whether housing properties are 
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owner occupied or renter occupied, could be positively or negatively related to social 
vulnerability. Homeowners can be more vulnerable to toxic emissions because they find 
moving more difficult than renters would. Conversely, renters may reside close to 
polluting facilities because leases are cheaper and commutes to work are shorter. Third, 
a social vulnerability score may obscure the weighted influences of each of its 
component variables. Some variables are more important than others as indicated by a 
comparison of their factor loadings.  
Nevertheless, the social vulnerability construct/scale is an effective strategy. This 
dissertation focused on a broader context under which social vulnerability occurs. It 
simplified the analysis and provided a clear picture of how multiple political economic 
levels of society affect the relationship between toxic emissions and social vulnerability 
of particular populations. In the next section, I focus specifically on context.  
Context Matters: Organizational Political Economy of the Environment  
 This dissertation, situated within the Organizational Political Economy of the 
environment framework (Prechel and Zheng 2012; Prechel and Istvan 2016), considers 
how organizations are embedded within political-legal arrangements and how their 
actions are in direct relation to the “dependencies, incentives, and opportunities” that 
they have to act in certain ways. I examined how organizational structure and the state 
and regional characteristics in which an organization is embedded not only directly 
impacted companies’ emissions but impacted the relationship that companies had with 
their local community. Overall, the fewer opportunities organizations had to exploit their 
local populations, the less likely the emissions were to be higher or hazardous. This is 
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illustrated by the fact that states with stronger environmental records were more likely 
than other states to have facilities that had less toxic emissions. Additionally, 
companies/plants that clustered in the same area also had fewer opportunities to emit 
higher toxic emissions, partly due to their increased dependencies on the location.  
 The method of multilevel modeling used in this dissertation served to focus the 
analysis on how certain variables were embedded or clustered in larger context. The use 
of the state and regional clusters, recognized that organizational behavior is not 
independent from the social structure, but is a direct result of the social structure.   
Concluding Thoughts 
In Jonathan Lear’s Radical Hope (2008), he writes of the loss of the Crow (a 
Native American tribe) identity and life as they moved from a nomadic life to a life on a 
reservation. He says “no one dances the sun dance anymore because it is no longer 
possible to do so. Once planting a coup-stick loses meaning, so, too, does the Sun 
Dance. One might still teach people the relevant steps; people might learn how to go 
through the motions; and they can even call it the “Sun Dance” but the Sun Dance itself 
has gone out of existence.”  
Although risk analysis and risk assessments have been used to develop public 
policy, the concept remains tricky and sociological research has struggled with its 
ambiguity. In his 1984 presidential address for the American Sociological Association 
Annual Meeting, James Short called for sociologists to take seriously the social 
implications of risk analysis. Risk is defined as the likelihood or probability of some 
adverse effects of a hazard. Hazards are “historical and spatial processes of urban 
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ecological change that have become increasingly unbounded in time and space” (Elliot 
and Frickel 2013; 525). They incorporate threats and collateral damage to people and 
what they value. Contemporary environmental hazards are increasingly connected to 
industrialization and the human pursuit of economic development. The risks associated 
with development have been consistently downplayed (Elliot and Frickel 2013). 
However, as industrial societies become more complex they become more concerned 
with these human created risks (Beck 2009) and how they should be assessed.  
Additionally, Freudenburg (1993) argued that we must rethink the debates 
surrounding risk perceptions, paying closer attention to the institutions responsible for 
risk management. His recreancy perspective focused on the people, organizations, and 
institutions responsible for protecting the community and do not fulfill their 
responsibilities.  He argued that the community’s risk has less to do with the actual 
hazard, and more to do with the inability of those responsible to enforce regulations and 
mitigate potential hazards effectively.63 Freudenberg called here for new research on: 
“the kinds of institutional arrangements that are most and less likely to foster recreant 
behavior, and about the factors that can foster or frustrate the efforts of recreant officials 
and organizations to evade responsibility for their failings (927).”   
 
The use of the food manufacturing industry in this analysis was particularly 
important. As one of the highest emitters of toxic pollution according to the Toxic 
                                                 
63 Bullard et al. (2007) also discusses further steps that need to be taken to reduce the 
risk of toxic emissions on socially vulnerable communities. These include but are not 
limited to a full implementation of the original executive order signed by president 
Clinton (Executive Order 12898), increasing the EPA”s environmental justice initiatives, 
requiring safety buffers around polluting facilities, requiring risk assessments before 
providing a permit for a facility to operate.  
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Release Inventory, and one of the largest employers of low income and minority 
populations, it has a strong relationship to the social vulnerability of communities across 
the United States.  In contemporary society we have become accustomed to all of the 
benefits that this industry provides including things like microwaveable foods and 
cleaned and packaged meat products. However, the increased environmental risk that 
comes with the continued development of this industry continues to be understudied.  
For this dissertation, I conducted quantitative analyses that add to the scientific 
enterprise by calculating the risk of exposure to toxic emissions for socially vulnerable 
populations.  This project began during a time of relative advances in environmental 
laws, particularly as they related to environmental justice in the United States.  By the 
time I am concluding this process, the tide has shifted. The presidency of Donald Trump 
has ushered in a new era of environmental deregulation and we are yet to see the 
outcomes of his problematic and potentially disastrous environmental policies.   
We can talk about environmental justice and the role of corporations in doing 
environmental harm, but what does it all mean? As we consider the consequences of 
even less government funding for enforcing environmental laws and collecting the 
important data needed for enforcing those laws, this dissertation is one tool to help think 
about how a population’s vulnerability is impacted by political-legal arrangements. It is 
situated in a historical lineage of activism and resistance to environmental harm of 
people and places associated with continued capitalist production, and I hope that the 
research that comes after refines and continues the process.  
“After this, Nothing Happened” 
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APPENDIX A: PARENT COMPANY AND FACILITIES IN 2010 TRI DATA SET 
 Table 13: Parent Company and Facilities in 2010 TRI Data Set 
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Dairy Farmers Of America  1 
Aarhuskarlshamn Aak 1 
Ab Mauri Food Inc. 1 
Abbott Laboratories 2 
Adams Group Inc. 1 
Adron Inc. 1 
Afa Foods 1 
Ag Processing Inc. 4 
Agri Star Meat & Poultry Llc 1 
Agri-King Inc. 1 
Agri-Mark Inc. 4 
Agribeef Co 1 
Agropur Inc. 1 
Ajinomoto Heartland Inc. 1 
Al Gilbert Co 2 
Albion Group 0 
Allens Inc. 1 
Alpenrose Dairy 1 
America'S Catch Inc. 1 
American Crystal Sugar Co 1 
American Dehydrated Foods Inc. 2 
American Foods Group Llc 1 
American Proteins Inc. 5 
American Sugar Refining Inc. 1 
Anderson Dairy 1 
Anderson Erickson Dairy 1 
Anheuser-Busch Inbev 1 
Archer Daniels Midland 22 
Associated British Foods N.A. Corp 1 
Associated Milk Producers Inc. 4 
Aventine Renewable Energy Inc. 1 
Aviagen Feed Processing Unit 1 
B&G Foods Inc. 2 
Balchem Corp 2 
Basic American Foods 2 
Bay State Milling Co 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Beef Products Inc. 4 
Behrends Feed & Fertilizer Lp 1 
Berner Cheese Corp 1 
Best-Ever Dairy Products 1 
Biazzo Dairy Products Inc. 1 
Big Gain Inc. 1 
Biorigin 1 
Birds Eye Foods Inc. 1 
Birmingham Hide & Tallow Co Inc. 1 
Blommer Chocolate Co 1 
Blue Bell Creameries Lp 1 
Blue Diamond Growers 1 
Bluegrass Dairy & Food Llc 1 
Boar'S Head Provisions Co Inc. 2 
Bob Evans Farms Inc. 1 
Bonduelle Usa Inc. 1 
Bongards' Creameries 2 
Borden Inc. 3 
Bp Products N.A. Inc. 1 
Brewster Cheese Inc. 1 
Brooks Food Group Inc. 1 
Buffet Partners Lp Dba Dynamic Foods 1 
Bunge Ltd 6 
Butterball Llc 3 
Byrne Dairy 1 
Cagle's Inc. 1 
California Dairies Inc. 5 
California Natural Products 1 
Campbell Soup Co 4 
Cargill Inc. 21 
Carolina Pride Foods Inc. 1 
Cgb Enterprises Inc. 1 
Ch Guenther & Son Inc. 3 
Chelsea Milling Co 1 
Chemstar Products Co 2 
Chs Inc. 1 
Citrosuco North America Inc. 1 
Citrus World Inc. 1 
  
149 
 
Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Claxton Poultry Farms 1 
Clover Stornetta Farms Inc. 1 
Colgate-Palmolive Co 2 
Columbus Foods 1 
Conagra Foods Inc. 18 
Confish Inc. 1 
Conopco Inc. 1 
Cooper Hatchery Inc. 1 
Cti Foods Llc 1 
Ctp 1 
Cutrale Citrus Juices Usa Inc. 1 
D L Lee & Sons 1 
Dairiconcepts Lp 3 
Dairy Farmers Of America Inc. 10 
Dannon Co 1 
Darling International Inc. 2 
Davisco Foods International Inc. 3 
Daybrook Fisheries Inc. 1 
Dean Dairy Holdings Llc 3 
Dean Foods Co 41 
Del Monte Corp 1 
Del Monte Foods Co 5 
Delano Growers Grape Products 1 
Delta Oil Mill 1 
Devro International Plc 1 
Dfa 0 
Dfs Inc. 1 
Diamond V Mills Inc. 1 
Dole Food Co Inc. 3 
Dpf Holdings Inc..; C/O Dole Packaged F 1 
Dr Pepper Snapple Group 2 
Dreyer'S Grand Ice Cream 2 
Dupont 0 
E I Du Pont De Nemours & Co 6 
E&J Gallo - San Joaquin V 1 
Eagle Family Foods 1 
Eastern Minerals Inc. 1 
Ed&F Man Liquid Product Corp 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Elite Spice Inc. 1 
Empire Kosher Poultry Inc. 1 
Evolution Fresh Inc. 1 
F & A Dairy Products Inc. 1 
Farmdale Creamery Inc. 1 
Farmer'S Pride Inc. 1 
Farmers Feed & Supply Co 1 
Farmers Rice Cooperative 1 
Farmers Union Industries Llc 1 
Farmland Dairies Llc 1 
Farmland Foods Inc. 3 
Feed Energy Co 1 
Felda Iffco Sdn Bhd 1 
Ferrara Candy Co 1 
Fieldale Farms Corp 3 
Fieldbrook Foods Corp 1 
First District Assoc 1 
Fmc Corp 1 
Foremost Farms Usa Cooperative 1 
Foster Farms 12 
Foster Turkey Products Ftp-1 1 
Fpl Food Llc 1 
Fresh Mark Inc. 2 
Freshwater Farms Products Llc 1 
Friesland Campina 1 
Fuji Specialties Inc. 1 
Gallo Cattle Co 1 
General Mills Inc. 8 
George'S Inc. 7 
Georges Family Farms Llc 1 
Gerber Products Co 1 
Gerber'S Poultry Inc. 1 
Givaudan Us Inc. 1 
Glanbia Plc 1 
Goldsboro Milling Co 1 
Gossner Foods Inc.. 1 
Gourmet Express 1 
Great American Appetizers 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Great Lakes Cheese Co Inc. 2 
Gusto Packing Co Inc. 1 
H P Hood Llc 2 
Hain Pure Protein 1 
Hanover Foods Corp 1 
Hans Rothenbuhler & Son Inc. 1 
Harim Usa Ltd 4 
Harrison Poultry Inc. 2 
Hartsville Oil Mill 1 
Hartz Mountain Corp 1 
Hearthside Food Solutions Llc 2 
Heartland Catfish 1 
Heb Grocery Co Lp 2 
Heinz 2 
Hero 1 
Hershey Foods Corp 1 
Hi Plains Feed Llc 1 
Hi-Pro Feeds Inc.. 3 
Hiland Dairy Foods Co 1 
Hillshire Brands Co 2 
Hilmar Cheese Co 2 
Hj Baker & Bro Inc. 1 
Honan Holding'S Usa Inc. 1 
Hormel Foods Corp 12 
House Of Raeford 5 
Hp Hood Llc 5 
Hubbard Feeds Inc. 2 
Idaho Milk Products Inc. 1 
Inc.obrasa Industries Ltd 1 
Indiana Packers Corp 1 
Ingredion Inc. 5 
Iowa Turkey Growers Cooperative 1 
J R Simplot Co 6 
J. M. Smucker Co 1 
Jasper Products 1 
Jasper Wyman & Son 1 
Jbs Usa Llc 5 
Jfc Inc. 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Jg Boswell Co 3 
Jm Huber Corp 1 
Joseph Adams Corp 1 
Kalsec Inc. 1 
Kaneka Nutrients Lp 1 
Keebler Co 1 
Kellogg Co 4 
Kemin Industries Inc. 1 
Ken'S Foods Inc. 2 
Kent Corp 2 
Kerry Inc. 3 
Keynes Brothers Inc. 1 
Keystone Foods Llc 7 
King & PrInc.e Seafood Corp 1 
Knightsbridge Biofuels Llc 1 
Knouse Foods Coop Inc. 6 
Koch Foods 7 
Koninklijke Dsm Nv 2 
Kraft Foods Group Inc. 6 
Kyowa Hakko Bio 1 
La La Usa 1 
Lactalis American Co Inc. 1 
Lallemand Inc. 2 
Lamb-Weston/Rdo Frozen 1 
Land O Lakes Inc. 50 
Land-O-Sun Dairies Llc 1 
Lauridsen Group Inc. 2 
Leprino Foods Co 1 
Lesaffre International 2 
Loders Croklaan Usa Llc 1 
Lopez Foods Inc. 1 
Losurdo Foods Inc. 1 
Louis Dreyfus Corp Inc. 2 
Mangus International Group 1 
Marquez Brothers International Inc. 1 
Mars Inc. 4 
Marshall Durbin Food Corp 4 
Marshall Minerals Inc. 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Maxwell Farms 1 
Mccain Foods Usa Inc. 4 
Mcshares Inc. 2 
Md & Va Milk Producers Cooperative Inc. 2 
Mead Johnson & Co Llc 2 
Mennel Milling Co 1 
Michael Foods Inc. 4 
Michigan Milk Producers Assoc 1 
Michigan Sugar Co 3 
Michigan Turkey Producers 1 
Mid-South Milling Co Inc. 1 
Milk Specialties Global 1 
Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative 1 
Minnesota Soybean Processors 1 
Mom Brands 1 
Mondelez International Inc. 3 
Morton Salt Inc. 2 
Mountaire Farms Inc. 5 
Munson Lakes Nutrition Llc 1 
Murphy Brown Llc 9 
Murry'S  Inc. 1 
Muscatine Foods Corp 3 
Nash Johnson & Sons Farms Inc. 3 
National Beef Packing Co Llc 1 
National Dairy Holdings 2 
National Grape Cooperative Assoc 1 
Naturex Sa 1 
Nbty Inc. 1 
Nestle 13 
New World Pasta 1 
Nippon Suisan Usa 1 
Nitta Gelatin Inc. 1 
Northwest Dairy Assoc 10 
Novus Arkansas Llc 1 
O-At-Ka Milk Products Cooperat Ive Inc. 1 
Ocean Gold Inc. 1 
Ocean Spray Cranberries Inc. 1 
Odom'S Tennessee Pride Sausage Inc. 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Ok Industries Inc. 3 
Omega Protein Inc. 4 
Osi Group 1 
Osi Industries Llc 1 
Owensboro Grain Holding Co Inc. 1 
Pasco Processing Llc 1 
Patterson Vegetable Co Llc 1 
Peco Farms Inc. 0 
Peco Foods Inc. 2 
Pendleton Flour Mills Llc 1 
Penford Corp 1 
Pepsico Inc. 8 
Perdue Farms Inc. 21 
Perkins & Marie Callenders' Inc. 1 
Perrigo Nutritionals 1 
Pfizer Inc. 1 
Phibro Animal Health Corp 2 
Pictsweet Llc 5 
Pilgrims Pride Corp 29 
Pinnacle Foods Group Llc 2 
Plains Dairy Llc 1 
Planter Cotton Oil Mill 1 
Prairie Farms Dairy Inc. 8 
Premium Standard Farms Llc 3 
Prestage Farms Inc. Texhoma Feed Mill 1 
Prinova Solutions 1 
Producers Cooperative Oil Mill 1 
Protein Products Inc. 1 
Publix Super Markets Inc. 3 
Pyco Industries Inc. 2 
Quali-Tech Inc. 1 
Raisio Group - Benecol Div 1 
Ralcorp Holdings Inc. 4 
Ranch-Way Inc. 1 
Rembrandt Enterprises Inc. 2 
Riceland Foods Inc. 1 
Ridley Inc. 4 
Ridley Inc.. 2 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Roberts Dairy Co 1 
Robinson Dairy Llc 1 
Rockview Dairies Inc. 1 
Roger Wood Foods 1 
Roquette Freres 1 
Rose Acre Farms Inc. 1 
Rose Packing Co Inc. 1 
Rumiano Cheese Co 1 
Safeway Inc. 3 
Sam Kane Beef Processors Inc. 1 
Sanderson Farms Inc. 1 
Sanimax Usa Inc. 1 
Saputo Inc. 3 
Sara Lee Corp 1 
Sartori Co 1 
Schreiber Foods Inc. 3 
Schwan'S Global Supply Chain Inc. 3 
Seaboard Corp 1 
Sem Minerals Lp 1 
Seneca Foods Corp 1 
Sensient Technologies Corp 1 
Sethness Products Co 1 
Shamrock Food Co 1 
Shaws Southern Belle Frozen Foods Inc. 1 
Simmons Farm Raised Catfish I Nc 1 
Simmons Foods Inc. 4 
Smith Dairy Products Co 2 
Smith Frozen Foods Inc. 1 
Smithfield Packing Co Inc. 1 
Snake River Sugar Co 3 
Snokist Growers - Cannery Div 1 
South Dakota Soybean Processors 1 
Southeastern Mills Inc. 2 
Southeastern Minerals Inc. 1 
Southern Hens Inc. 1 
Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperat.. 2 
Southern States Coop Inc. 5 
Southfresh Aquaculture Llc 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Southwest Cheese Llc 1 
St Albans Cooperative Creamery Inc. 1 
Star Of The West Milling Co 1 
State Of North Dakota 1 
Steuben Foods Inc. 1 
Stewart'S 1 
Stremicks Heritage Foods 2 
Sugar Cane Growers Cooperative Of Flor.. 1 
Sugar Creek Packing Co 1 
Suiza Dairy Holdings Llc 1 
Sunny Meadows Dairy & Food 1 
Sunopta Inc. 2 
Super Store Industries 2 
Superior Dairy 1 
Superior Fish Products Inc. 1 
Swift & Co 1 
Swiss Valley Farms Cooperative 1 
Tampa Bay Fisheries Inc. 1 
Tate & Lyle 5 
Tennessee Farmers Cooperative 1 
The Clemens Family Corp 1 
The Coca-Cola Co 1 
The Dannon Co Inc. 1 
The Hartz Mountain Corp 1 
The Hillshire Brands Co 2 
The Kroger Co 14 
The Mennel Milling Co 4 
The Orignal Honeybaked Ham Co Of Ga 
Inc. 1 
The Quaker Oats Co 1 
The Smithfield Foods Inc. 6 
Tillamook County Creamery Assoc 2 
Townsend Farms Inc. Bonlee (9215) 3 
Toyota Industries N.A. 1 
Transpackers Services Corp 1 
Tree House Foods Inc. 1 
Trident Seafoods Corp 1 
Triumph Foods Llc 1 
Trouw Nutrition Usa Llc 1 
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Table 13 (Cont.)  
Parent Company Number of Facilities  
Turner Holdings Llc 1 
Tuscan/Lehigh Dairies Inc. 1 
Twin Counties Dairy Llc 1 
Twin Rivers Technologies Us Inc. 1 
Two Farms Inc. 1 
Tyson Foods 67 
Ultra Dairy Llc 1 
Unilever 1 
United Dairy Farmers Inc. 1 
United Dairymen Of Arizona 1 
Upstate Niagara Cooperative Inc. 2 
Us Sugar Corp 2 
Usa Yeast Co 1 
Valley Fine Foods 1 
Valley Proteins Inc. 5 
Valley Queen Cheese Factory Inc. 1 
Virginia Poultry Growers Cooperative Inc. 2 
Vitasoy International Holdings Ltd 1 
Wacker Chemical Corp 1 
Wakefern Food Corp 1 
Wapsie Valley Creamery Inc. 1 
Watkins Associated Industries 1 
Wawa Inc. 1 
Wayne Farms Llc 10 
Wells Enterprises Inc.. 2 
Wenger'S Feed Mill Inc. 7 
West Liberty Foods Llc 2 
Western Sugar Cooperative 2 
Weston Foods 1 
Wilkins-Rogers Inc. 2 
Willmar Poultry Farms Inc. 1 
Windsor Foods 1 
Wyoming Sugar 1 
Xl Four Star Beef Holdings (Idaho) Inc. 1 
Zausner Foods Corp 1 
Zeeland Farm Services Inc. 1 
Zinpro Corp 1 
Total Facilities  1,031 
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APPENDIX B 
MAPS OF TRI FOOD MANUFACTURING FACILITIES IN THE U.S. BY EPA 
REGION (2010) 
Figure 4: Region 1  
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Figure 5: Region 2  
Figure 6: Region 3  
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Figure 7: Region 4  
Figure 8: Region 5  
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Figure 9: Region 6  
Figure 10: Region 7  
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Figure 11: Region 8  
Figure 12: Region 9  
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Figure 13: Region 10  
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APPENDIX C: STEPS FOR MERGING DATA AND UTILIZING THE AREAL 
APPORTIONMENT METHOD 
1. Block group shape files and data were downloaded from 
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/tiger-line.html and inputted into 
ARCGIS.  
2. State shapefiles and demographic data were merged using ARC GIS (Regional 
Maps were created to make the data more manageable). 
3. Using the geographic calculator in ARCGIS, the total area of each block group 
was calculated. 
4. Emissions data was downloaded from the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Toxic Release Inventory and Risk-Screening Environmental Indicators (RSEI) 
websites and were added to ARCMap. 
5. Using the ARCGIS geoprocessing buffer tool, 1, 2 and 3 mile buffers were 
calculated around each TRI facility. 
6. Using the ARCGIS geoprocessing intersect tool, demographic data were merged 
with the emissions and risk data and buffers.  
7. Using the geographic calculator in ARCGIS, the area of each block group that 
fell in one of the three buffers was calculated. The field calculator determined the 
percentage of the total area of every block group that was in each buffer zone.  
8. All data was transferred into STATA. 
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9. In Stata, all weighted characteristics were grouped and aggregated by facility. If 
the same area was within the buffer area of more than one facility, the weighted 
population characteristics for that area were calculated with each facility.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
